AMU - AMSE
5-9 Boulevard Maurice Bourdet, CS 50498
13205 Marseille Cedex 1
bourles
Publications
This paper explores the effect of moral hazard on both risk-taking and informal risk-sharing incentives. Two agents invest in their own project, each choosing a level of risk and effort, and share risk through transfers. This can correspond to farmers in developing countries, who share risk and decide individually upon the adoption of a risky technology. The paper mainly shows that the impact of moral hazard on risk crucially depends on the observability of investment risk, whereas the impact on transfers is much more utility dependent.
We identify the impact of intermediate goods markets imperfections on productivity downstream. Our empirical specification is based on a model of multifactor productivity (MFP) growth in which the effects of upstream competition can vary with distance to frontier. This model is estimated on a panel of fifteen OECD countries and twenty industries over 1985 to 2007. Competitive pressures are proxied with industry product market regulation data. We find evidence that anticompetitive upstream regulations have significantly curbed MFP growth over the past fifteen years, and more strongly so for observations that are close to the productivity frontier. © 2013 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Based on a disaggregation of the workforce into three qualification or educational attainment categories, the article estimates the effects on hourly productivity from changes in the employment rate structure and from changes in the qualification structure. 21 OECD countries are then ranked in terms of the potential gains in GDP they could expect from moving to the educational attainment rates and employment rates of the best performing countries.
We examine how risk-sharing is impacted by asymmetric information on the probability distribution of wealth. We define the optimal incentive compatible agreements in a two-agent model with two levels of wealth. When there is complete information on the probability of the different outcomes, the resulting allocation satisfies the mutuality principle (which states that everyone's final wealth depends only upon the aggregate wealth of the economy). This is no longer true when agents have private information regarding their probability distribution of wealth. Asymmetry of information (i) makes ex-post equal sharing unsustainable between two low-risk agents, and (ii) induces exchanges when agents have the same realization of wealth.
We identify the impact of intermediate goods markets imperfections on productivity downstream. Our empirical specification is based on a model of multifactor productivity growth in which the effects of upstream competition can vary with distance to frontier. This model is estimated on a panel of 15 OECD countries and 20 industries over 1985-2007. Competitive pressures are proxied with industry product market regulation data. We find evidence that anticompetitive upstream regulations have significantly curbed MFP growth over the past 15 years, and more strongly so for observations that are close to the productivity frontier.<br><small>(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)</small>
The paper exploits macro-panel data for OECD countries. Close to the technological frontier, the education level, product market rigidities and employment protection legislation would be significantly related to TFP growth, with a substantial contribution of the interaction between market rigidities.
This study ties in with recent literature on how a country’s growth determinants are shaped by its technological position. In addition to the effects of education and regulations on the goods market and labour market, we also explore potential interaction between these regulations. We use data on 17 OECD countries for the period 1985-2003. Our main novel findings are the characterization of the effects of (1) the education level of the working-age population and (2) rigidities in the goods market and labour market on total factor productivity (TFP) growth. For countries close to the technological frontier, the effects seem very significant. An interaction between the rigidities in the two markets is clearly visible. The strong impact of higher-education level and rigidities on TFP growth appears to reflect a direct influence and an indirect effect via the diffusion of ICTs. In the goods market, the “entry barriers”, “market structure”, and “degree of vertical integration” seem to have a major influence. For countries far from the technological frontier, our estimates show that the higher-education level of the working-age population and rigidities in the goods market and labour market do not necessarily have a significant impact on TFP growth. These results underscore the importance of gains in productivity growth, and therefore in potential GDP growth, that some industrialized countries—mainly in Europe, including France—could expect from policies aimed at raising the education level of the working-age population and at reducing rigidities in the goods market and labour market.
-
Estimating returns to hours worked and the employment rate provides us with an original interpretation of changes in US productivity and other industrialized countries' catch-up with US productivity levels over recent decades.
L’estimation de la productivité horaire « structurelle » permet une lecture originale des inflexions de la productivité aux États-Unis et du phénomène de rattrapage, sur les dernières décennies, de son niveau par les autres pays industrialisés.