Laussel

Publications

Trade and the location of industries: Some new resultsJournal articleDidier Laussel et Thierry Paul, Journal of International Economics, Volume 71, Issue 1, pp. 148-166, 2007

No abstract is available for this item.

Increasing returns, entrepreneurship and imperfect competitionJournal articleJean J. Gabszewicz et Didier Laussel, Economic Theory, Volume 30, Issue 1, pp. 1-19, 2007

We study a simple bilateral oligopoly model in which individual agents, who are initially endowed with capital, decide sequentially (1) whether they want to act as producers (entrepreneurs) or as capital lenders (rentiers) and, then (2) which quantity of capital they would like to borrow or lend, though exchange of capital units against units of the produced good. Production takes place under increasing returns to scale. We show the existence of “natural equilibria”, at which wealthier capital owners become entrepreneurs while the remaining ones decide to be rentiers. We also study the efficiency of equilibria which is shown to increase by replication of the economy, but sometimes to decrease as a consequence of wealth redistribution.

Transport Costs and North-South TradeJournal articleDidier Laussel et Raymond Riezman, Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Volume 13, Issue 2, pp. 111-122, 2006

We develop a simple two country model of international trade that assumes that there is a fixed cost associated with transporting goods across national boundaries. We show that this leads to multiple equilibria that can be Pareto-ranked. One of these equilibria is autarky. We argue that the existence of fixed costs in transport can help explain the low volume of North-South trade.

Are Manufacturers Competing through or with Supermarkets? A Theoretical InvestigationJournal articleDidier Laussel, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Volume 6, Issue 1, pp. 1317-1327, 2006

We study a model with product differentiation by manufacturers and spatial differentiation by supermarkets where the customers visit only one shop and the supermarkets carry both goods. Under fixed fee pricing by the manufacturers the intensity of interbrand competition increases with the degree of differentiation between the supermarkets. When the supermarkets are more and more spatially differentiated the struggle between manufacturers and supermarkets dominates the competition between the manufacturers and results in lower wholesale prices and manufacturers profits.

Special Interest Politics and Endogenous Lobby FormationJournal articleDidier Laussel, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Volume 6, Issue 1, pp. 1-14, 2006

We analyze endogenous lobby formation within a slightly modified version of the "special interest politics" model of Persson (1998). In our model the interest groups hold different fixed endowments of an "infrastructure good" which is a complement in consumption of the local public good. For any fixed set of organized groups the lobbying game is shown to have a unique equilibrium if the cost-elasticity of the supply of public good to the interest groups by the government is not too large. The groups which benefit from larger infrastructure endowments are then proved to be the ones which become organized while the others remain unorganized.

Competition in the Media and Advertising MarketsJournal articleJean J. Gabszewicz, Didier Laussel et Nathalie Sonnac, Manchester School, Volume 74, Issue 1, pp. 1-22, 2006

We examine how media competition is affected when making endogenous advertising rates. To this end, we revisit some well-known contributions in which advertising rates and volumes are viewed as exogenous, so that the effects of advertising on diversity and industry concentration only depend on the size of the audience, without taking into account how the media audience depends itself on advertising rates. We rely on the two-sided market structure which characterizes the media and advertising industry and allows advertising rates and audience size to be jointly determined at equilibrium. Finally, we study how making the advertising rate dependent on the audience size may influence the content and diversity of the media industry. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester, 2006.

"Favors" for Sale: Strategic Analysis of a Simple Menu Auction with Adverse SelectionJournal articleDidier Laussel et Michel Le Breton, Annals of Economics and Finance, Volume 6, Issue 1, pp. 53-73, 2005

We study the distribution of a fixed amount of "favors" by an incumbent politician between two pressure groups, each of them offering to the agent a campaign contribution contingent on the quantity of "favors" received. Assuming that the total amount supplied is a private information of the politician the equilibrium contribution schedules are fully characterized. It is shown that the principals net equilibrium payoffs are larger the more quickly their marginal valuations of the favors decrease with the amount received. The equilibrium allocation of the stock of "favors" is efficient if the interest group utility functions are identical.

L'effet taille de marché un réexamen du modèle de Helpman-Krugman et de quelques extensionsJournal articleDidier Laussel et Thierry Paul, Revue d'économie politique, Volume 115, Issue 5, pp. 545-560, 2005

The objective of this article is to bring a new light to the literature on the ?home market effect? based on the pioneering article by Helpman and Krugman (1985). We present some works which show that the existence of net trade between two countries of different sizes, the trade structure and the pattern of specialization can highly depend on the relative size of the large country.

Does advertising lower the price of newspapers to consumers? A theoretical appraisalJournal articleJean J. Gabszewicz, Didier Laussel et Nathalie Sonnac, Economics Letters, Volume 87, Issue 1, pp. 127-134, 2005

We study whether advertising subsidizes consumers newspapers, prices. Using a model representingthe two-sided network effects between the advertising and printed media industries, we show that theanswer should be nuanced according to the readership,s attitude toward advertising.

The sources of protectionist drift in representative democraciesJournal articleDidier Laussel et Raymond Riezman, European Economic Review, Volume 49, Issue 7, pp. 1855-1876, 2005

We analyze a two country-two good model of international trade in which citizens in each country differ by their specific factor endowments. The trade policy in each country is set by the politician who has been elected by the citizens in a previous stage. Due to a delegation effect citizens generally favor candidates who are more protectionist than they are. The (multiple) one candidate per country-equilibria exhibit a “protectionist drift“ owing to this delegation effect. In addition, we find an additional source of “protectionist drift“ which we call the abstention effect. Not only do candidates wish to delegate to more protectionist colleagues, but these more protectionist colleagues who can win election, prefer still more protectionist candidates than themselves. Therefore, they have an incentive to abstain, that is, not run for election. We show that because of this “abstention effect“ there exists a range of electable citizens all of whom are more protectionist than the median voter’s most preferred candidate.