This chapter is a general summarised presentation of the problem of defining the best possible choice of the overall income distribution in macrojustice (as opposed to microjustice and mesojustice concerned with allocations directly of specific goods or in particular instances). The three classical polar principles advocate respectively self-ownership and transfers motivated by comparisons of individuals’ incomes and welfares. They are synthesised by people’s general ethical views in the society that has to implement the policy. Actual policies show the material possibilities (for instance the exemption of overtime labour earnings from the income tax that amounts to basing transfers on capacities). The result is a simple and richly meaningful distributive structure that means, jointly, equal real liberty; adding an egalitarian and a classical liberal parts of income; reciprocity by providing each other with the product of the same labour; and an equal basic income financed by an equal partial labour of each. This core principle is then applied taking all the actual economic and social phenomena into account. The questions this may raise are analysed and answered in the various chapters of this volume.

These concluding comments and considerations briefly summarise the achievement of this volume’s set of complementary contributions, answer the main questions posed and pending, and provide the necessary basic analysis and evaluation of the other distributive principles which are alternatives or complements to the one obtained here. The basis is the synthesis between the three polar possible ethical principles for macrojustice: income justice, self-ownership and the proper welfarism. Its central piece is a distributive coefficient k which can provide solutions from the pure self-ownership of classical liberalism for k = 0 to freedom-respecting income-egalitarian ideals. This choice results from the impartial moral judgment of the distributive society in question, representable in particular by comparisons between the “pure welfare” of members and which can be revealed by a number of methods. Non-human resources can be allocated according to various principles, but their equal sharing results from various types of association with the solidaristic equal-freedom allocation of the value of the human resources, and it permits more self-ownership for the same degree of distribution. The relevant introduction of the obtained distributive policy makes everybody better-off. Distributive principles alternative to the one obtained include those based on ordinal welfarism (equity-no-envy and the equivalence principle) and reductions to mesojustice or microjustice. Finally, the moral public goods of justice or caring about others’ needs elicit various types of motives which make the nature of the corresponding transfers be quite more subtle and rich than simple coercion or voluntariness.

A minimum disparity estimator minimizes a [phi]-divergence between the marginal density of a parametric model and its non-parametric estimate. This principle is applied to the estimation of stochastic differential equation models, choosing the Hellinger distance as particular [phi]-divergence. Under an hypothesis of stationarity, the parametric marginal density is provided by solving the Kolmogorov forward equation. A particular emphasis is put on the non-parametric estimation of the sample marginal density which has to take into account sample dependence and kurtosis. A new window size determination is provided. The classical estimator is presented alternatively as a distance minimizer and as a pseudo-likelihood maximizer. The latter presentation opens the way to Bayesian inference. The method is applied to continuous time models of the interest rate. In particular, various models are tested using alternatively tests and their results are discussed.

We propose a Bayesian approach for inference in a dynamic disequilibrium model. To circumvent the difficulties raised by the Maddala and Nelson (1974) specification in the dynamic case, we analyze a dynamic extended version of the disequilibrium model of Ginsburgh et al. (1980). We develop a Gibbs sampler based on the simulation of the missing observations. The feasibility of the approach is illustrated by an empirical analysis of the Polish credit market, for which we conduct a specification search using the posterior deviance criterion of Spiegelhalter et al. (2002).