ouvrage en hommage à C.A. Michalet
Où la mondialisation conduit-elle l'économie? Pour tenter de répondre à cette question, les auteurs prolongent ici les intuitions de l'économiste Charles-Albert Michalet en analysant les espaces de la mondialisation : la finance globale, les bourses de valeurs, le commerce mondial - cet « impérialisme à l'envers » -, les pressions protectionnistes européennes ainsi que la globalisation de la propriété intellectuelle. Il s'agit de comprendre également comment les principaux acteurs de la mondialisation, les États et les Firmes, dépassent et entretiennent la crise. En effet, la concurrence que se font les États pour attirer les investisseurs étrangers nourrit cette crise malgré les politiques nationales d'innovation. De leur côté, les Firmes qui inscrivent désormais leurs stratégies dans une recomposition mondiale de l'industrie et des services, accentuent les flux de délocalisation et de relocalisation des activités. Dans un même temps, de nouvelles Firmes originaires du « Sud » font irruption dans l'espace mondial. La force de travail doit ainsi s'adapter à une nouvelle donne qui va de la financiarisation des Firmes à l'individualisation des rémunérations.
L’industrie informatique est une industrie des moins anciennes. Pourtant, depuis sa naissance au tout début des années 1950, elle a connu des bouleversements successifs qui en ont peu à peu transformé les bases, les modalités de la concurrence, les modes de production, le déploiement international… Longtemps considérée comme un oligopole strictement dominé par la puissance d’IBM et orientée vers les « grands comptes », l’informatique a connu une multiplication de ses segments de marché qui té...
Création de la Haute Autorité pour la Diffusion des Œuvres et la Protection des droits sur Internet (HADOPI)
however powerful. Considering knowledge as a mutual resource requires a rethinking of the value chain concept, since cash flow is derived from use of the knowledge base (services, complementary products), not from the knowledge itself. In a classical industrial economics perspective, this reshaping of the value chain must be analyzed not only at the global ecosystem level (who produces what, between firms and universities, users and producers, etc.), but also at the industrial level (once the industry?s role has been identified, how does it organize itself ?). Various points of view have been proposed, but researchers have generally studied either the involvement of firms in a community or the integration of FLOSS into their market strategy, but not both. In this article, we argue for a more structured and global analysis, based on the tools of industrial economics, and thus starting from the basic conditions of the computer market and of the buyers? competence in software development (the Â« dominant user?s skill Â»). This conceptual framework helps to distinguish the different types of corporate behavior we see in the FLOSS ecosystem and more specifically their varying degrees of involvement.
The participation of firms in Free/Libre/Open Source Software (FLOSS) communities is growing and is increasingly debated among scholars. As Ousterhout (1999) explained, ?FLOSS needs profit? and we do not know of any successful FLOSS products without firms in their ecosystem, either through the financial support of foundations (Eclipse, Linux) or the commercial supply of products or services (MySQL, Red Hat Linux). Various views of these phenomena have been proposed, but scholars have usually studied either the involvement of firms in a community or the integration of FLOSS into their market strategy, but not both. In this article, we argue for a more structured and global analysis, based on concepts of industrial economics, and thus starting from the basic conditions of the computer market and demand. This conceptual framework helps to distinguish the different roles firms may play in the FLOSS ecosystem and, more specifically, the different ways they are involved in development. JEL Codes: L11, L15, L22, L86
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In this paper, we model the formation of innovation networks as they emerge from bilateral decisions. In contrast to much of the literature, here firms only consider knowledge production, and not network issues, when deciding on partners. Thus, we focus attention on the effects of the knowledge and information regime on network formation. The effectiveness of a bilateral collaboration is determined by cognitive, relational, and structural embeddedness. Innovation results from the recombination of knowledge held by the partners to the collaboration, and its success is determined in part by the extent to which firms' knowledge complement each other. Previous collaborations (relational embeddedness) increase the probability of a successful collaboration, as does information gained from common third parties (structural embeddedness). Repeated alliance formation creates a network. Two features are central to the innovation process: how firms pool their knowledge resources, and how firms derive information about potential partners. When innovation is decomposable into separate subtasks, networks tend to be dense; when structural embeddedness is important, networks become cliquish. For some regions in this parameter space, small worlds emerge.
This paper deals with open software as an innovation system based on knowledge accessibility. It addresses four issues: welfare implications, incentives, the legal framework and the coalitions involved.
For economists, knowledge accessibility is viewed as a mechanism which generates e¢ cient outcomes. The welfare implications are clear: no monopoly distorsion; spillovers do not reduce but rather increase innovator's incentives. These welfare implications are magnified in the case of open source because software benefits from unlimited increasing returns in terms of production as well as in terms of diffusion.
The basic problem when discussing incentives is to understand why voluntary spillovers occur at all. Economists will try to answer by exploring those mechanisms which allow agents to obtain a private benefit by freely revealing their innovative work. Actually, for any system promoting knowledge openness, incentives are necessary to motivate people to reveal their knowledge freely to others and to make it more profitable to be an innovator than a free-rider.
The legal framework to protect open source software is based on the principle of making the disclosure of the source-code of the programs concerned and any further improvement compulsory. This appears to be a very efficient way to maintaining the "good properties" of the system.
The production of software then has to be analysed as the production of a public good. It is based on individual contributions and generates a use value the benefit from which does not depend on the contribution. By contributing to open source, developers are rewarded in terms of learning and in terms of reputation. But today, the trade-off is not simply between contributing or not, but in the allocation of resources between business and open source software development. This implies a new level of incentives that can be of private (firms) or public, origin (technological policy).
Marseilles industry tends currently to organize at the level of her metropolitan area. But it hasn?t always been the fact. Industry has been organized firstly around the harbour and the activities related to overseas and more particularly to the French colonial empire. There was no hinterland and the city enclosed within her hills line was exclusively turned towards the sea. When this way of working reached its limits this disconnection with her surroundings turned back against the city. Economic and social crisis spread out while new economic development dynamics were experienced in the cities around as a revenge mobilizing a series of rivalries. Today the centre city profits by a clear renewal; her rehabilitated image is not anymore discarded by investors. She draws benefits from her coastal location, her urban culture and her scientific potential to attract and develop modern immaterial and knowledge based industrial activities. It is then a whole metropolitan system that might emerge and spread off, leaning on the rich variety of resources of this urban and periurban structure. But this will probably require a still lacking political will to impose such a metropolitan view against old sectarianisms and reciprocal distrust.
In this paper we develop a model of R&D alliance formation. Pairs of firms combine their knowledge in an attempt to innovate. Whether this attempt is successful depends in part on whether the pair has been successful in the past: accumulated experience teaches a pair of firms how to innovate together, but at the same time increases the similarity of their knowledge stocks. A tension exists between the desire for a familiar partner, and desire for a partner with complementary knowledge. How this tension is resolved depends on the nature of the innovation process itself, and the elasticity of substitution of different types of knowledge inputs in knowledge production. From the alliance-innovation process, a variety of networks form. In different parts of the parameter space we observe isolated agents, a dense, connected network, and small worlds.