Publications
As countries and firms increasingly seek ways to strengthen the resilience of their supply chains, this paper studies the global economic costs of a decoupling of global supply chains along geopolitical lines as well as in strategic sectors. We explore not only the long-run effects but also the short-run costs stemming from rigid wages and low substitutability across factors of production and input goods. We find that, in terms of welfare losses, the costs of decoupling are roughly five times higher in the short-run compared with the long-run, while country losses are heterogeneous. A reshaping of global supply chains increases the level of consumer prices in most countries, as well as producer prices, especially for trade-intensive manufacturing sectors. Global supply chain decoupling entails also a reallocation of labour across skill levels. Finally, global trade would decrease substantially, driven by lower trade in intermediate inputs and a higher reliance of countries on domestic production.
Based on a unique database (data on 2529 bank-firm relationships of 403 firms from 2012 to 2018) provided by the Central Bank of Tunisia, this article analyses the impact of the intensity and duration of bank-firm relationship on loan quality. By estimating a panel ordered probit model, the results show that the intensity of the lending relationship has a positive (negative) impact on high (medium or low) quality loans. In addition, the duration of the bank-firm relationship increases the probability of low-quality loans. We also find that the impact of relationship lending on loan quality differs according to the level of profitability of the firm. Low and non-performing firms tend to have longer and closer bank relationship, whereas it is the opposite for performing firms. Our results suggest that in an emerging market concentrated around a few banks, longer and closer banking relationships are mainly in favour of low and non-performing firms, reflecting adverse selection and strong moral hazard.
PDF | Background: The objective of this study is to examine social inequalities in employee mental well-being, using relational social class indicators.... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on ResearchGate
The Malthusian trap is a well recognized source of stagnation in per capita income prior to industrialization. However, previous studies have found mixed evidence about its exact strength. This article contributes to this ongoing debate by estimating the speed of convergence for a panel of 9 preindustrial European economies over a long period of time (14th–18th century). The analysis relies on a calibrated Malthusian model for England and β-convergence regressions. I find evidence of significant differences in the strength of the Malthusian trap between preindustrial European economies. The strongest estimated Malthusian trap is in Sweden, with a half-life of 20 years. The weakest estimated Malthusian trap is in England, with a half-life of about 230 years. This implies that some preindustrial economies were able to experience prolonged variations in their standards of living after a shock, while still being subject to Malthusian stagnation in the long run.
What patterns of economic relations arise when people are altruistic rather than strategically self-interested? What are the welfare implications of altruistically-motivated choices of business partners? This paper introduces an altruism network into a simple model of choice among partners for economic activity. With concave utility, agents effectively become inequality averse towards their friends and family. Rich agents preferentially choose to work with poor friends despite productivity losses. These preferential contracts can also align with welfare since the poor benefit the most from income gains and these gains can outweigh the loss in output. Hence, network inequality—the divergence in incomes within sets of friends and family—is key to how altruism shapes economic activity, output, and welfare. When skill homophily —the tendency for friends to have the skills needed for high production—is high, preferential contracts and productivity losses disappear since rich agents have poor friends with the requisite qualifications.
We study how altruism networks affect the demand for formal insurance. Agents with CARA utilities are connected through a network of altruistic relationships. Incomes are subject to a common shock and to a large individual shock, generating heterogeneous damages. Agents can buy formal insurance to cover the common shock, up to a coverage cap. We find that ex-post altruistic transfers induce interdependence in ex-ante formal insurance decisions. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the insurance game and show that agents act as if they are trying to maximize the expected utility of a representative agent with average damages. Altruism thus tends to increase demand of low-damage agents and to decrease demand of high-damage agents. Its aggregate impact depends on the interplay between demand homogenization, the zero lower bound and the coverage cap. We find that aggregate demand is higher with altruism than without altruism at low prices and lower at high prices. Nash equilibria are constrained Pareto efficient.
Plus de 4 000 définitions relevant des différents domaines de l'économie, notamment en finance (crise de 2008, finance islamique...), en politique sociale (régimes de retraite...), économie de l'environnement (empreinte écologique, écodéveloppement...). La présentation des différents courants, t...
The aim of this study (EPIDIAB) was to assess the relationship between epicardial adipose tissue (EAT) and the micro and macrovascular complications (MVC) of type 2 diabetes (T2D).
