Publications
Introduction:
Developing countries face major challenges in implementing universal health coverage (UHC): a widespread informal sector, general discontent with rising economic insecurity and inequality and the rollback of state and public welfare. Under such conditions, estimating the demand for a health insurance scheme (HIS) on voluntary basis can be of interest to accelerate the progress of UHC-oriented reforms. However, a major challenge that needs to be addressed in such context is related to protest attitudes that may reflect, inter alia, a null valuation of the expected utility or unexpressed demand.
Methods:
We propose to tackle this by applying a contingent valuation survey to a non-healthcare-covered Tunisian sample vis-à-vis joining and paying for a formal HIS. Our design pays particular attention to identifying the nature of the willingness-to-pay (WTP) values obtained, distinguishing genuine null values from protest values. To correct for potential selection issues arising from protest answers, we estimate an ordered-Probit-selection model and compare it with the standard Tobit and Heckman sample selection models.
Results:
Our results support the presence of self-selection and, by predicting protesters' WTP, allow the “true” sample mean WTP to be computed. This appears to be about 14% higher than the elicited mean WTP.
Conclusion:
The WTP of the poorest non-covered respondents represents about one and a half times the current contributions of the poorest formal sector enrolees, suggesting that voluntary participation in the formal HIS is feasible.
Although the Covid-19 crisis has shown how high-frequency data can help track the economy in real time, we investigate whether it can improve the nowcasting accuracy of world GDP growth. To this end, we build a large dataset of 718 monthly and 255 weekly series. Our approach builds on a Factor-Augmented MIxed DAta Sampling (FA-MIDAS), which we extend with a preselection of variables. We find that this preselection markedly enhances performances. This approach also outperforms a LASSO-MIDAS—another technique for dimension reduction in a mixed-frequency setting. Though we find that a FA-MIDAS with weekly data outperform other models relying on monthly or quarterly data, we also point to asymmetries. Models with weekly data have indeed performances similar to other models during “normal” times but can strongly outperform them during “crisis” episodes, above all the Covid-19 period. Finally, we build a nowcasting model for world GDP annual growth incorporating weekly data that give timely (one per week) and accurate forecasts (close to IMF and OECD projections but with 1- to 3-month lead). Policy-wise, this can provide an alternative benchmark for world GDP growth during crisis episodes when sudden swings in the economy make usual benchmark projections (IMF's or OECD's) quickly outdated.
Using a Markov-perfect equilibrium model, we show that the use of customer data to practice intertemporal price discrimination will improve monopoly profit if and only if information precision is higher than a certain threshold level. This U-shaped relationship lends support to a popular view that knowledge is good only if it is sufficiently refined. When information accuracy can only be achieved through costly investment, we find that investing in profiling is profitable only if this allows to reach a high enough level of information precision. Consumers expected surplus being a hump-shaped function of information accuracy, we show that consumers have an incentive to lobby for privacy protection legislation which raises the cost of monopoly's investment in information accuracy. However, this cost should not dissuade firms to collect some information on customers' tastes, as the absence of consumers' profiling is actually detrimental to consumers.
This paper estimates trade barriers in government procurement, a market that accounts for 12 percent of world GDP. Using data from inter-country input–output tables in a gravity model, we find that home bias in government procurement is significantly higher than in trade between firms. However, this difference has decreased over time. Results also show that trade agreements with provisions on government procurement increase cross-border flows of services, whereas the effect on goods is small and not different from that in private markets. Provisions on transparency and procedural requirements are particularly instrumental in increasing cross-border government procurement.
The interest rate at which US firms borrow funds has two features: (i) it moves in a countercyclical fashion and (ii) it is an inverted leading indicator of real economic activity: low interest rates today forecast future booms in GDP, consumption, investment, and employment. We show that a Kiyotaki–Moore model accounts for both properties when interest-rate movements are driven, in a significant way, by self-fulfilling belief shocks that redistribute income away from lenders and to borrowers during booms. The credit-based nature of such self-fulfilling equilibria is shown to be essential: the dynamic correlation between current loanable funds rate and future aggregate economic activity depends critically on the property that the interest rate is state-contingent. Bayesian estimation of our benchmark DSGE model on US data shows that the model driven by redistribution shocks results in a better fit to the data than both standard RBC models and Kiyotaki–Moore type models with unique equilibrium.
Tests of labor supply models often rely on wages. However, wage variation alone generally cannot disentangle the classical time separable model and its extensions: reference dependent preferences (income targeting) and time nonseparable preferences (disutility spillovers; timing-specific preferences). We set up a novel laboratory experiment in which individuals choose their working time. We vary, independently, wages, historical income paths, and cumulative past work. We also vary the timing of experimental sessions. Statistical tests and stochastic revealed preference methods cannot reject the classical model in favor of income targeting or disutility spillovers, but the data suggest that labor supply varies by time-of-the-day.
We solve the nonlinear income tax program for rank-dependent social welfare functions, expressing the trade-off between size and inequality using the Gini and related families of positional indices. Absent bunching, ranks in the actual and optimal allocations are invariant. Exploiting this feature, we provide new, simple, and intuitive tax formulas for both the quasilinear and additive cases and new comparative static results. Our approach makes insights from optimal taxation more widely accessible. In some of our simulations the actual US tax policy is close to being optimal—except at the top, where optimal rates are much higher than in actuality.
L'équilibre entre la vie professionnelle et la vie privée, le bien-être subjectif et la satisfaction au travail sont autant d'éléments susceptibles d'avoir un impact sur la vie des collaborateurs dans l'entreprise. L'employeur a donc tout intérêt à traiter avec soin ces sujets pour maintenir ou construire un lien avec les employés. L'article propose d'étudier ces rapports dans le contexte particulier de collaborateurs suivant un parcours santé d'AMP qui exacerbe encore un peu plus ces liens de causes à effets. C'est toute la problématique de l'accompagnement par l'employeur des collaborateurs en vulnérabilité qui est explorée ici. De la qualité de cet accompagnement par la GRH notamment, dépend donc la force du lien entre l'employeur et le collaborateur.
Efficiency within the health system is well recognised as key for achieving Universal Health Coverage (UHC). However, achieving equity and efficiency simultaneously is often seen as a conflicting effort. Using 12 years of data (2003–2014) from the selection of a number of low- and lower middle-income countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Indonesia, Mongolia, Mozambique, Tajikistan, Togo, Uzbekistan and Yemen Republic), we compute an index of Universal health coverage (UHC), measure the health system’s performance (HSp) and, finally, investigate the cross-dynamics of the resulting HSp and the UHC previously obtained. We find that, with the few exceptions over the statistical sample, the causality between performances of the national health system and the universal health coverage is typically bidirectional. From an empirical standpoint, our findings challenge the idea from economic orthodoxy that efficiency must precede equity in healthcare services. Rather, our findings support the view of simultaneous efforts to improve expansion of the coverage and efficiency of the health system, directing attention towards the importance of organisation of the health system in the country context.
This paper addresses the question of the effectiveness and permanence of temporary incentives to contribute to a public good. Using a common experimental framework, we investigate the effects of a recommendation that takes the form of an exhortative message to contribute, a monetary punishment and a non-monetary reward to sustain high levels of contributions. In particular, we shed light on the differential impact these mechanisms have on heterogeneous types of agents. The results show that all three incentives increase contributions compared to a pre-phase where there is no incentive. Monetary sanctions lead to the highest contributions, but a sudden drop in contributions is observed once the incentive to punish is removed. On the contrary, Recommendation leads to the lowest contributions but maintains a long-lasting impact in the Post-policy phase. In particular, it makes free-riders increase their contribution over time in the post-incentive phase. Finally, non-monetary reward backfires against those who are weakly conditional cooperators. Our findings emphasize the importance of designing and maintaining incentives not only for free-riders, but for strong and weak conditional cooperators as well, depending on characteristics of the incentives.
