Publications
This paper provides a long-run cycle perspective to explain the behavior of the annual flow of inheritance. Based on the low- and medium frequency properties of long time bequests series in Sweden, France, UK, and Germany, we explore the extent to which a two-sector Barro-type OLG model is consistent with such empirical regularities. As long as agents are sufficiently impatient and preferences are non-separable, we show that endogenous fluctuations are likely to occur through two mechanisms, which can generate independently or together either period-2 cycles or Hopf bifurcations. The first mechanism relies on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution or equivalently the sign of the cross-derivative of the utility function whereas the second rests on sectoral technologies through the sign of the capital intensity difference across two sectors. Furthermore, building on the quasi-palindromic nature of the degree-4 characteristic equation, we derive some meaningful sufficient conditions associated to the occurrence of complex roots and a Hopf bifurcation in a two-sector OLG model.
This paper examines the adaptation policy of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) facing climate change. We consider a dynamic economy with the following ingredients: (i) natural capital is an input in local production that is degraded as a result of climate change; (ii) the government has two instruments to cope with climate-related damages: it can adjust the population size thanks to migration policies and/or it can undertake adaptation measures in order to slow the degradation of natural assets; (iii) expatriates send remittances back home. We identify two critical conditions on the fundamentals of the economy that helps understand the features of the optimal policy. We especially show that in most situations, the migration policy is a valuable instrument. Calibrating the model for Caribbean SIDS, we find that the optimal policy of the Caribbean region displays heterogeneity, that is explained by the different degradation rate, population size, and endowment in natural capital. We also highlight that the higher the climate damages, the higher the incentives to conduct an active adaptation policy, combining conventional adaptation actions and migration.
We first give a pre-order principle whose form is very general. Combining the pre-order principle and generalized Gerstewitz functions, we establish a general equilibrium version of set-valued Ekeland variational principle (denoted by EVP), where the objective function is a set-valued bimap defined on the product of quasi-metric spaces and taking values in a quasi-ordered linear space, and the perturbation consists of a subset of the ordering cone multiplied by the quasi-metric. From this, we obtain a number of new results which essentially improve the related results. Particularly, the earlier lower boundedness condition has been weakened. Finally, we apply the new EVPs to Psychology.
Combining seven years of household data from an original field experiment in villages of Jharkand, East India, with meteorological data, this paper investigates how Indian Self-Help Groups (SHGs) enable households to withstand rainfall shocks. I show that SHGs operate remarkably well under large covariate shocks. While credit access dries up in control villages one year after a bad monsoon, reflecting strong credit rationing from informal lenders, credit flows are counter-cyclical in treated villages. Treated households experience substantially higher food security during the lean season following a drought and increase their seasonal migration to mitigate expected income shocks. Credit access plays an important role, together with other SHG aspects such as peer networks. These findings indicate that local self-help and financial associations can help poor farmers to cope with climatic shocks and to implement risk management strategies.
Souvent appréhendés à l’échelle internationale, ces acteurs sont ici étudiés dans leurs relations situées avec l’État, à partir d’une approche empirique et localisée. Parce qu’ils s’engagent dans les politiques de développement, ils deviennent des partenaires tolérés par le pouvoir selon différentes logiques de « décharge ». Tandis que leur périmètre d’action est soigneusement négocié avec les autorités publiques pour des raisons matérielles, statutaires et sécuritaires, la pérennité de leurs actions est due, entre autres, à leur capacité à négocier des combinaisons d’imaginaires politico-religieuses, ce qui ne les empêche pas de participer aux rapports de domination existants.
Souvent appréhendés à l’échelle internationale, ces acteurs sont ici étudiés dans leurs relations situées avec l’État, à partir d’une approche empirique et localisée. Parce qu’ils s’engagent dans les politiques de développement, ils deviennent des partenaires tolérés par le pouvoir selon différentes logiques de « décharge ». Tandis que leur périmètre d’action est soigneusement négocié avec les autorités publiques pour des raisons matérielles, statutaires et sécuritaires, la pérennité de leurs actions est due, entre autres, à leur capacité à négocier des combinaisons d’imaginaires politico-religieuses, ce qui ne les empêche pas de participer aux rapports de domination existants.
Canada exhibits no correlation between income and victimization, rich neighborhoods are less exposed to property crime, rich households are more victimized than their neighbors, and rich households and neighborhoods invest more in protection. We provide a theory consistent with these facts. Criminals within city choose a neighborhood and pay a search cost to compare potential victims, whereas households invest in self-protection. As criminals' return to search increases with neighborhood income, households in rich neighborhoods are likelier to enter a race to greater protection driving criminals toward poorer areas. A calibration reproduces the Canadian victimization and protection pattern by household/neighborhood income.
This paper presents an artefactual field experiment with craftsmen working on renovation projects to assess the effect of training programs and incentive schemes on coordination. Workers frequently fail to coordinate their tasks when not supervised by a project coordinator. This is particularly important in the construction sector where it leads to a lack of final performance in buildings. We introduce two different incentives: a first contract paying craftsmen only according to their individual performance, and a second contract paying a group of three craftsmen with a weak-link payment according to the group’s worst performance. In addition, we test these incentives on two different subject groups: one is composed of craftsmen trained to coordinate their tasks, and the others are not. The results suggest that trained subjects coordinate at significantly higher effort levels than non-trained subjects when facing an individual-based incentive. However, when facing a group-based incentive, non-trained subjects seem to ”catch up” trained subjects in terms of coordination level, while these latter subjects do not significantly increase their performance level.
We study the canonical Krugman (1979) trade model with non-CES preferences that yield autarky at finite trade costs. We prove a non-monotone impact of gradual trade liberalization. At first, near autarky, emerging trade reduces world welfare, while at free trade it becomes large enough to be beneficial (Krugman's result). This non-monotonicity persists under heterogenous firms. The harmful small-scale trade is explained by variable markups and underpriced imports, which become socially excessive. Unlike protectionists, we argue that “liberalization should go far”. On the other hand, we show that anti-dumping measures can be viewed as a remedy for the aforementioned imports distortion.
