Publications

We consider a game where a finite number of retailers choose a location, given that their potential consumers are distributed on a network. Retailers do not compete on price but only on location, therefore each consumer shops at the closest store. We show that when the number of retailers is large enough, the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium and we construct it. We then compare the equilibrium cost borne by the consumers with the cost that could be achieved if the retailers followed the dictate of a benevolent planner. We perform this comparison in terms of the Price of Anarchy (i.e., the ratio of the worst equilibrium cost and the optimal cost) and the Price of Stability (i.e., the ratio of the best equilibrium cost and the optimal cost). We show that, asymptotically in the number of retailers, these ratios are bounded by two and one, respectively.

Saturated values no longer describe the reality of the times. Today's postmodern environment requires new managerial practices to ensure that business processes render organizations meaningful. Unlike the modern era, which focused on economic efficiency and productivity, the prevailing climate values creativity, emotional connection, and balance in personal and work life. In this postmodern context, managers must tailor their approach to employee expectations, and concentrate on the regulation of human relationships rather than individual performance control. Instead of exercising the power that comes with their position, they need to use their authority to foster happiness through trust and caring at work. In so doing, they have to relay information, be meaningful, animate those around them, regulate working relationships, and serve as leaders.

The literature on immigration and health has provided mixed evidence on the health differentials between immigrants and citizens, while a growing body of evidence alludes to the unhealthy assimilation of immigrants. Relying on five different health measures, the present paper investigates the heterogeneity in health patterns between immigrants and citizens, and also between immigrants depending on their country of origin. We use panel data on more than 100,000 older adults living in nineteen European countries. Our panel data methodology allows for unobserved heterogeneity. We document the existence of a healthy immigrant effect, of an unhealthy convergence, and of a reversal of the health differentials between citizens and immigrants over time. We are able to estimate the time threshold after which immigrants’ health becomes worse than that of citizens. We further document some heterogeneity in the convergence of health differentials between immigrants and citizens in Europe. Namely, the unhealthy convergence is more pronounced in terms of chronic conditions for immigrants from low-HDI countries, and in terms of self-assessed health and body-mass index for immigrants from medium- and high-HDI countries.

Economists typically view personal income taxes as a tradeoff between distortionary effects on labour supply and desirable effects on the income distribution. However, when wages deviate from marginal product, there is an efficiency rationale for income taxation. In the empirically relevant setting of wage bargaining within hierarchical firms, the efficiency case for taxing the manager at the top of the firm depends on a “job-creation” effect: if wages are too low and increased labour supply allows managers to supervise larger firms and thus collect larger rents, they will work too hard to create jobs at their firm. It may then be efficient to tax the “job creators” because of their job-creation activity. If bargaining compresses the wage distribution for workers, the efficient tax schedule is V-shaped and deviates significantly from zero in a model calibrated to the U.S. income distribution. For a planner with redistributive motives, wage bargaining similarly raises optimal marginal tax rates at the top and bottom of the distribution, while decreasing them in the middle.