Publications
This paper highlights the procyclical and unstable behaviour of mutual funds, characterized by a varying sensitivity on common asset pricing factors. It proposes a novel factor model that allows for regime changes associated with macroeconomic and financial state variables. Estimated on a panel covering 825 US equity mutual funds over a period of 30 years, it appears that the yield curve, the dividend yield, short term interest rates and the industrial production coincide with regimes switches in the Fama–French factors. Furthermore, the estimated regimes coincide with financial crises and economic downturns, thus confirming the procyclical behaviour of mutual funds' returns. These findings, coupled with the emerging systemic role of mutual funds, promote the consideration for a specific macroprudential regulatory framework targeted at the mutual fund industry.
A common practice in many auctions is to offer bidders an opportunity to improve their bids, known as a best and final offer stage. This improved bid can depend on new information either about the asset or about the competitors. This paper examines the effects of new information regarding competitors, seeking to determine what information the auctioneer should provide assuming the set of allowable bids is discrete. The rational strategy profile that maximizes the revenue of the auctioneer is the one where each bidder makes the highest possible bid that is lower than his valuation of the item. This strategy profile is an equilibrium for a large enough number of bidders, regardless of the information released. We compare the number of bidders needed for this profile to be an equilibrium under different information structures. We find that it becomes an equilibrium with fewer bidders when less additional information is made available to the bidders regarding the competition. It follows that when the number of bidders is a priori unknown, there are some advantages to the auctioneer not revealing information and conducting a one-stage auction instead.
In this paper, we evaluate the causal effects of climate policies on carbon emissions reduction. Specifically, we investigate the properties of the Granger causality test in the frequency domain, assuming that the dependent variables include a binary variable and a continuous variable (resp. treatment and outcome variables). Monte Carlo simulations confirm that: (i) this test is valid under this assumption; and (ii) it has more power than its time-domain counterpart. Then, using Sweden as a case study, we evaluate the impact of the Kyoto Protocol, the Swedish carbon tax, and the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) on carbon emissions reduction over the period 1964–2021. Our empirical results indicate that only the carbon tax Granger causes carbon emissions reduction in the long run. Our methodological framework offers policymakers a useful toolbox for climate policy evaluation as well as new insights into the outcomes of international treaties and carbon pricing policies.
Several papers explain why asset bubbles are observed when growth is large. These papers differ in the role of the bubble, used to provide liquidities or as collateral in a borrowing constraint. We compare the liquidity and collateral roles of bubbles in an overlapping generations model. When the bubble is deterministic, the equilibrium is identical under these two roles, implying that the same mechanism explains the crowding-in effect of the bubble on growth. With stochastic bubbles, growth is larger when bubbles play the liquidity role, because the burst of a bubble used for liquidity is less damaging to capital investors.
To compare income and wealth distributions and to assess the effects of policy that affect those distributions require reliable inequality-measurement tools. However, commonly used inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient have an apparently counter-intuitive property: income growth among the rich may actually reduce measured inequality. We show that there are just two inequality measures that both avoid this anomalous behavior and satisfy the principle of transfers. We further show that the recent increases in US income inequality are understated by the conventional Gini coefficient and explain why a simple alternative inequality measure should be preferred in practice.
The objective of this paper is to emphasize the differences between a call and a warrant as well as the different valuation methods of warrants which have been introduced in the financial literature. For the sake of simplicity and applicability, we only consider a debt-free equity-financed firm. More recently a formal distinction between structural and reduced form pricing models has been introduced. This distinction is important whether one wishes to price a new warrant issue or outstanding warrants. If we are interested in pricing a new issue of warrants, e.g. in the context of a management incentive package, one has to rely on a structural model. However most of practitioners use the simple Black-Scholes formula. In this context, we analyze the accuracy of the approximation of the “true” price of a warrant by the Black-Scholes formula. We show that in the current low interest rate environment, the quality of the approximation deteriorates and the sensitivity of this approximation to the volatility estimate increases.
We consider a nondurable good monopolist that collects data on its customers in order to profile them and subsequently practice price discrimination on returning customers. The monopolist’s price discrimination scheme is leaky in the sense that an endogenous fraction of consumers choose to incur a privacy cost to conceal their identity when they return in the following periods. We characterize the Markov perfect equilibrium of the game under two alternative customer profiling regimes: full information acquisition (FIA) and purchase history information (PHI). In both cases, we find that, contrary to what could be expected, the monopolist’s aggregate profit is not monotonically increasing in the level of the privacy cost, but a U-shaped function of it, leading to ambiguous profit effects: a reduction in privacy costs increases the fraction of customers who choose to be anonymous (detrimental profit effect), but it also softens the firm’s introductory price, reducing the pace at which prices targeted to new customers fall over time (positive profit effect). When comparing results under FIA and PHI, we find that market expansion is faster, and more customers conceal their identity under FIA than under PHI. Equilibrium profits are also higher in the FIA case. Although equilibrium profits are U-shaped functions of the privacy cost in both profiling regimes, they tend to be globally decreasing with the privacy cost under PHI and globally increasing under FIA.
This paper was accepted by Eric Anderson, marketing.
Introduction Alcohol use disorder (AUD) is associated with a significant disease burden in France, where alcohol use is deeply rooted in culture. However, the treatment gap is large because of several barriers, including stigmatisation and drinkers' apprehension about total abstinence. However, standardised and evidence-based interventions based on controlled-drinking for people with AUD are lacking. We aimed to assess the effectiveness of a novel community-based French therapeutic patient education (TPE) program for people with AUD named Choizitaconso. Methods A before-after non-randomised quasi-experimental study, named ETHER, was designed and implemented with people living with AUD, over a period of 6 months. The primary outcome was percentage change in the number of alcohol-related harms experienced. Secondary outcomes were percentage changes in psycho-social patient-reported and community-validated outcomes. Participants in the intervention group (n = 34) benefited from the 10-week TPE program Choizitaconso, while the comparison group (n = 58) received standard care. The Kruskall–Wallis and chi-squared or Fisher's exact tests were used to compare before-after changes in variables in both groups. Linear regression models were used to test for the effect of study group on each outcome and to test for the effect of alcohol consumption as a confounder. Results At 6 months, all outcomes but one either remained stable or numerically improved in both groups. Internalised stigma significantly improved in the intervention group (p = 0.026) but not in the comparison group (p = 0.207), with a significant group effect (p = 0.014). Discussion and Conclusions This study demonstrates the effectiveness of the Choizitaconso TPE program on community-validated outcomes, especially internalised stigma.
This paper analyzes the impact of fiscal spending shocks in a dynamic, multi-country model with international production networks. The response of real GDP to a fiscal spending shock can be decomposed into a Direct, Income, and Price effect. The Direct Effect depends only on input-output linkages, while the Price Effect is zero in the aggregate. We apply this decomposition to the Eurozone, and find that fiscal spillovers from Germany and the core Eurozone countries can be large, and within the range of empirical estimates. Without international production networks, spillovers would be significantly smaller. In an empirical application using the decomposition we find results strongly consistent with the model.
Revealed and stated preference techniques are widely used to assess willingness to pay (WTP) for non-market goods as input to public and private decision-making. However, individuals first have to satisfy subsistence needs through market good consumption, which affects their ability to pay. We provide a methodological framework and derive a simple ex post adjustment factor to account for this effect. We quantify its impacts on the WTP for non-market goods and the ranking of projects theoretically, numerically and empirically. This confirms that non-adjusted WTP tends to be plutocratic: the views of the richest – whatever they are – are more likely to impact decision-making, potentially leading to ranking reversal between projects. We also suggest that the subsistence needs-based adjustment factor we propose has a role to play in value transfer procedures. The overall goal is a better representation of the entire population’s preferences with regard to non-market goods.
