Publications

We analyze theoretically an institution called a “limited-tenure concession” for its ability to induce efficient public goods contribution and common-pool resource extraction. The basic idea is that by limiting the tenure over which an agent can enjoy the public good, but offering the possibility of renewal contingent on ample private provision of that good, efficient provision may be induced. We first show in a simple repeated game setting that limited-tenure concessions can incentivize socially-efficient provision of public goods. We then analyze the ability of this instrument to incentivize the first best provision for common-pool natural resources such as fish and water, thus accounting for spatial connectivity and growth dynamics of the resource. The duration of tenure and the dispersal of the resource play pivotal roles in whether this limited-tenure concession induces the socially optimal private provision. Finally, in a setting with costly monitoring, we discuss the features of a concession contract that ensure first-best behavior, but at least cost to the implementing agency.

This paper examines the effect of weather shocks on violent crime using disaggregated data from Brazilian municipalities over the period 1991–2015. Employing a distributed lag model that takes into account temporal correlations of weather shocks and spatial correlation of crime rates, I document that adverse weather shocks in the form of droughts lead to a significant increase in violent crime in rural regions. This effect appears to persist beyond the growing season and over the medium run in contrast to the conventional view perceiving weather effects as transitory. To explain this persistence, I show that weather fluctuations are positively associated not only with agriculture yields, but also with the overall economic activity. Moreover, evidence shows the dominance of opportunity cost mechanism reflected in the fluctuations of the earnings especially for the agriculture and unskilled workers, giving credence that it is indeed the income that matters and not the general socio-economic conditions. Other factors such as local government budget capacity, (un)-employment, poverty, inequality, and psychological factors do not seem to explain violent crime rates.

This study aims to evaluate people’s willingness to provide their geospatial global positioning system (GPS) data from their smartphones during the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on the self-determination theory, the addition of monetary incentives to encourage data provision may have an adverse effect on spontaneous donation. Therefore, we tested if a crowding-out effect exists between financial and altruistic motivations. Participants were randomized to different frames of motivational messages regarding the provision of their GPS data based on (1) self-interest, (2) pro-social benefit, and (3) monetary compensation. We also sought to examine the use of a negative versus positive valence in the framing of the different armed messages. 1055 participants were recruited from 41 countries with a mean age of 34 years on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online crowdsourcing platform. Participants living in India or in Brazil were more willing to provide their GPS data compared to those living in the United States. No significant differences were seen between positive and negative valence framing messages. Monetary incentives of $5 significantly increased participants’ willingness to provide GPS data. Half of the participants in the self-interest and pro-social arms agreed to provide their GPS data and almost two-thirds of participants were willing to provide their data in exchange for $5. If participants refused the first framing proposal, they were followed up with a “Vickrey auction” (a sealed-bid second-priced auction, SPSBA). An average of $17 bid was accepted in the self-interest condition to provide their GPS data, and the average “bid” of $21 was for the pro-social benefit experimental condition. These results revealed that a crowding-out effect between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations did not take place in our sample of internet users. Framing and incentivization can be used in combination to influence the acquisition of private GPS smartphone data. Financial incentives can increase data provision to a greater degree with no losses on these intrinsic motivations, to fight the COVID-19 pandemic.

In this paper, we introduce a new proximal algorithm for equilibrium problems on a genuine Hadamard manifold, using a new regularization term. We first extend recent existence results by considering pseudomonotone bifunctions and a weaker sufficient condition than the coercivity assumption. Then, we consider the convergence of this proximal-like algorithm which can be applied to genuinely Hadamard manifolds and not only to specific ones, as in the recent literature. A striking point is that our new regularization term have a clear interpretation in a recent “variational rationality” approach of human behavior. It represents the resistance to change aspects of such human dynamics driven by motivation to change aspects. This allows us to give an application to the theories of desires, showing how an agent must escape to a succession of temporary traps to be able to reach, at the end, his desires.