Patrick Leoni

amse seminar

Patrick Leoni

KEDGE Business School
Extremal markov perfect equilibria of repeated games with complementarities
Lieu

IBD Amphi

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Lundi 8 janvier 2018| 14:30 - 16:00
Contact(s)

Timothée Demont : timothee.demont[at]univ-amu.fr
Roberta Ziparo : rziparo[at]gmail.com

Résumé

Under standard assumptions, we show that the set of Markov Per- fect Equilibria in pure strategies is non-empty for stochastic repeated games with complementarities. We characterize the set of extremal values of those equilibria, and we show that those equilibria are unique fixed points of well-chosen operators. Those extremal equilibria can be approximated exponentially fast, and uniform convergence obtains for any initial guess chosen on a relevant functional set. This charac- terization also allows to generalize some standard results in monotone comparative statics known for one-shot games.

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