Patrick Leoni

General seminars
amse seminar

Patrick Leoni

KEDGE Business School
Extremal markov perfect equilibria of repeated games with complementarities

IBD Amphi

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre

5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Monday, January 8 2018| 2:30pm to 4:00pm

Timothée Demont: timothee.demont[at]
Roberta Ziparo: rziparo[at]


Under standard assumptions, we show that the set of Markov Per- fect Equilibria in pure strategies is non-empty for stochastic repeated games with complementarities. We characterize the set of extremal values of those equilibria, and we show that those equilibria are unique fixed points of well-chosen operators. Those extremal equilibria can be approximated exponentially fast, and uniform convergence obtains for any initial guess chosen on a relevant functional set. This charac- terization also allows to generalize some standard results in monotone comparative statics known for one-shot games.

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