Boucekkine
Raouf Boucekkine
Publications
We propose an endogenous growth model incorporating social capital. Social capital serves only as an input in the production of human capital and it involves a cost in terms of the final good. In contrast to alternative specifications, this model ensures that social capital enhances productivity gains by playing the role of a timing belt that drives the transmission and propagation of all productivity shocks. We find that, depending on the measure of social capital, the elasticity of human capital with respect to social capital varies from 6% to 10%. Finally, we investigate the short-term dynamics and imbalance effect properties of the model, depending on the value of this elasticity. In particular, we show that when the substitutability of social capital for human capital increases, the economy is better equipped to surmount initial imbalances, as individuals may allocate more working time to the final good sector without impeding economic growth.
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We consider a resource-dependent economy initially ruled by the elite. The transition from the autocratic to a more democratic regime takes place only if the citizens decide to revolt against the elite. The occurrence of a revolution primarily depends on the autocratic regime vulnerability and the level of inequalities, both being driven by the elite׳s redistribution and repression policies. First, we show that when a political transition is inevitable, the elite choose the maximum rate of redistribution to lengthen their period in office. Second, we find that the duration of the autocratic regime is linked to resource abundance, and how it relates to the elite׳s policies. More resources lead to a shorter reign of a redistributive regime, which may not be the case of a repressive regime. Finally, we interpret the Arab spring sequence in light of our findings.
We build an economico-epidemiological Solow-Swan model. Mortality and morbidity effects on effective labor are taken into account. A Ben-Porath-like mechanism affects the dynamics of the saving rate and reduces labor productivity. Based on optimal projections of the demographic and economic South African series on the period 2000-2050, we identify a delayed effect of HIV/AIDS on economic growth: the growth rate gap between the AIDS and no-AIDS scenarios is rather stable between 2010 and 2020, but then it increases sharply between 2020 and 2030, keeps increasing at a much lower pace between 2030 and 2040, and finally stabilizes after 2040. The fall in active population is the main factor behind AIDS impact on economic growth during the decade 2020-2030 while the Ben-Porath mechanism on labor productivity is more relevant in the last decade. Physical capital accumulation plays a minor role.
When cheap fossil energy is polluting and pollutant no longer absorbed beyond a certain concentration, there is a moment when the introduction of a cleaner renewable energy, although onerous, is optimal with respect to inter-temporal utility. The cleaner technology is adopted either instantaneously or gradually at a controlled rate. The problem of optimum under viability constraints is 6-dimensional under a continuous-discrete dynamic controlled by energy consumption and investment into production of renewable energy. Viable optima are obtained either with gradual or with instantaneous adoption. A longer time horizon increases the probability of adoption of renewable energy and the time for starting this adoption. It also increases maximal utility and the probability to cross the threshold of irreversible pollution. Exploiting a renewable energy starts sooner when adoption is gradual rather than instantaneous. The shorter the period remaining after adoption until the time horizon, the higher the investment into renewable energy.
We study an optimal AK-like model of capital accumulation and growth in the presence of a negative environmental externality in the tradition of Stokey (Int Econ Rev 39(1):1–31, 1998). Both production and consumption activities generate polluting waste. The economy exerts a recycling effort to reduce the stock of waste. Recycling also generates income, which is fully devoted to capital accumulation. The whole problem amounts to choosing the optimal control paths for consumption and recycling to maximize a social welfare function that notably includes the waste stock and disutility from the recycling effort. We provide a mathematical analysis of both the asymptotic behavior of the optimal trajectories and the shape of transition dynamics. Numerical exercises are performed to illustrate the analysis and to highlight some of the economic implications of the model. The results suggest that when recycling acts as an income generator, (1) a contraction of both the consumption and capital stock is observed in the long run after an expansion phase; (2) whether polluting waste is predominantly due to production or consumption, greater consumption and lower capital stock are obtained in the long run compared with the situation when recycling does not create additional income; (3) greater recycling effort and lower stock of waste are resulted in the long run.
This is an introduction to the special section on financial frictions and debt constraints.
We consider the optimal control of nonlinear integral equations with endogenous delay and state constraints, which describe a developing economy subjected to resource constraints. The economy invests in new resource-efficient technologies, invests in new capital, and scraps obsolete capital. We derive the optimality condition and determine long-term asymptotically exponential trajectories that optimally combine scrapping the dirtiest capital and developing new clean technologies. Next, we study the short-term dynamics of the model and show that it leads to a sustainable growth with active resource constraint.
The Ramsey model of economic growth is revisited from the perspective of viability theory. The Ramsey model, augmented with minimal consumption and sustainability criteria, becomes a viability problem. The framework allows for a clear picture of optimal viable, optimal non‐viable, and viable non‐optimal paths. The drastic sacrifices in terms of present consumption required by the implementation of Brundtland sustainability are visualized, the rich countries bearing the major part of the burden. The econometric analysis of viability sets enhances the role of technological progress in ensuring Brundtland sustainability. Preference parameters such as the pure time preference rate are statistically non‐significant. Le modèle de Ramsey de croissance économique est repris sous l'angle de la viabilité. Augmentée d'un critère de consommation minimale et d'un critère de soutenabilité, la croissance endogène devient un problème de viabilité. Les solutions comprennent les sentiers optimaux viables, les sentiers optimaux non viables, et les sentiers viables non‐optimaux. Les sacrifices en termes de consommation présente, nécessaires à la soutenabilité selon Brundtland, montrent que les pays riches doivent assumer la majeure partie du fardeau. L'analyse économétrique des volumes des ensembles de viabilité souligne le rôle du progrès technologique. Le taux pur de préférence temporelle s'avère statistiquement non significatif.
Contract theory qualifies legal origins theory by focusing on codified default rules, which ease the conclusion of enforceable contracts. We have selected 10 economically important codified contract types containing default rules and 8 countries particularly relevant as mother countries of legal origins, financial centers or newly industrialized economies (France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, the UK and the US). We exclude countries having received their laws as colonial “transplants” and countries in legal transformation. The economic impact of default rules is detectable by econometric analysis based on panel data inference over prolonged periods (1870-2008). Codified default rules favor economic performance, the higher their number the better. The results are controlled for time and country fixed effects, confirmed by counterfactual simulations and robust. We also test whether the presence of all ten contract types can compensate the absence of financial center advantage, and find that they do so in the civil law mother countries and the two newly industrialized countries of our sample. The Swiss case shows that the cumulation of default rule advantage and financial center advantage results in superior economic performance. While qualifying legal origins theory, our results strongly confirm institutional economics in its core of contract theory.
