Choosy Search And The Mismatch Of TalentsJournal articleBruno Decreuse, International Economic Review, Volume 49, Issue 3, pp. 1067-1089, 2008

This article proposes a multi-sector matching model where workers have (symmetric) sector-specific skills and the search market is segmented by sector. Workers choose the range of markets they are willing to participate in. I identify a composition externality: Workers do not take into account the impact of their choice on sector-specific mean productivity among the pools of job-seekers. Consequently, workers prospect too many market segments, and there is room for public policy even when the so-called Hosios condition holds. Copyright � 2008 the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Schizophrénie intergénérationnelleJournal articleBruno Decreuse et Bertrand Wigniolle, Recherches économiques de Louvain, Volume 72, Issue 1, pp. 49-74, 2006

Love pushed beyond its paroxysm leads to suffocation. That is the moral of this article, which depicts an altruistic parent setting her labour supply to offer the best living conditions to her child. When parents and children are perfectly substituable in production, this behaviour pushes all wages down. If hourly wages are rigid, employment is rationed and the youth are the primary victims of such rationing. We show this mechanism may originate endogenous fluctuations between under and full employment when the older workers? productivity negatively responds to past unemployment. We also analyse the political support for the minimum wage. When the youth productivity is random, the minimum wage, the older workers? labour supply and youth unemployment together rise with the intensity of parental altruism.

L'indemnisation du chômage : au-delà d'une conception « désincitative »Journal articleBruno Decreuse, Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc, François Fontaine et Solenne Tanguy, Revue d'économie politique, Volume 116, Issue 3, pp. 297-326, 2006

Unemployment compensation schemes have two goals: insuring against the risk of unemployment on the one hand, and financing job search on the other hand. During the past decades, the literature has mainly focused on the first goal, highlighting the moral hazard effects originated by unemployment benefits. However, several contributions, both empirical and theoretical, suggest unemployment compensation may also improve labour market efficiency, by alleviating the financial constraints that affect the job-seekers, helping to select the efficient search channel, or favoring the creation of high quality jobs. The present paper offers a synthesis of this literature in the paradigm of sequential job search theory.

Adaptability, productivity, and educational incentives in a matching modelJournal articleOlivier Charlot, Bruno Decreuse et Pierre Granier, European Economic Review, Volume 49, Issue 4, pp. 1007-1032, 2005

No abstract is available for this item.

Education, Mobility and Employers' Monopsony Power: A Search-theoretic AnalysisJournal articleBruno Decreuse et Pierre Granier, LABOUR : Review of Labour Economics and Industrial Relations, Volume 19, Issue 3, pp. 531-562, 2005

No abstract is available for this item.

Self-selection in education with matching frictionsJournal articleOlivier Charlot et Bruno Decreuse, Labour Economics, Volume 12, Issue 2, pp. 251-267, 2005

No abstract is available for this item.

Adaptabilité et complexité. Les choix éducatifs et technologiques sont-ils efficaces ?Journal articleBruno Decreuse et Pierre Granier, Revue Économique, Volume 56, Issue 3, pp. 551-562, 2005

European labour markets have known three majour changes over the past three decades : the complexification of the technological environment, the growth of general education across the workforce, and rising unemployment. Taken together, do these facts reflect the inefficiency of schooling and technological decisions ? Our answer takes place in a matching model of unemployment in which firms choose technological complexity, and workers educate to improve their adaptability. We show economic policy should focus on the labour market and the education system rather than on firms'technological choices.

Epargne de précaution, réseaux sociaux et assurance chômage publiqueJournal articlePierre Cahuc, Yann Algan, Bruno Decreuse, François Fontaine et Solenne Tanguy, Revue Française d'Économie, Volume 19, Issue 1, pp. 3-36, 2004

[fre] Cet article analyse les conséquences des systèmes publics d'assurance chômage lorsque les ménages peuvent disposer de méthodes alternatives soit d'auto- assurance sous forme d'épargne de précaution, soit d'assurance interpersonnelle sous forme de réseaux sociaux. Cette analyse apporte de nouveaux éclairages sur l'efficacité et le profil optimal de l'assurance publique aux regards de systèmes d'assurance privés ou familiaux, et sur le rôle de l'environnement institutionnel tel que le marché du crédit et les normes sociales dans l'activité de recherche d'emploi. [eng] Public Unemployment Benefits Versus Self-Insurance and Social Insurance This article reassesses the optimal level of public insurance schemes when pri- vate insurance with precautionary savings or familial insurance with social networks are taken into account. These features are found to deeply challenge the traditional efficiency and equity results attached to the provision of unemployment benefits and provide new room for public insurance.

Éducation, croissance et exclusion des chômeurs âgés dans un modèle dappariementJournal articleBruno Decreuse et Pierre Granier, Annals of Economics and Statistics, Issue 74, pp. 147-176, 2004

This paper analyses the relationships between education, growth and employment in a search model where education, employment and growth are endogenous. A vintage human capital model is developped, in which individuals lose skills in relative terms as new better skilled generations enter the economy. This phenomenon is due to the presence of an externality in the education process. On the supply side, firms incur a growth-indexed cost to create a new job. As a consequence, keeping a job vacant has an option value that grows at a constant rate in equilibrium, thereby implying that old unemployed are rejected from the search activity. Education increases growth, lowers the unemployment rate, but shortens the critical age below which unemployed individuals become unemployable. We also exhibit multiple equilibria, that cannot be Pareto-ranked.

Education, Qualification and EmploymentJournal articleBruno Decreuse et Vincent Barthelemy, Annals of Economics and Statistics, Issue 65, pp. 35-54, 2002

We construct a matching model of both skilled and unskilled unemployment, in which heterogeneous agents have to choose whether to become skilled or not, and how much education (a duration) to acquire. The decentralized economy may exhibit multiple equilibria, of which those exhibiting the highest (lowest) education duration are also those having the largest (smallest) skilled workforce. The private marginal return to education is lower than the social return, while the private return to occupation is higher than the social return. Consequently, we show that the social command may be decentralized through a subsidy to education and a limited access to the schooling sector.