This paper investigates, in the case of the euro area, the standard assumption that the liquidity trap steady state, which arises from the existence of the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate, is locally unstable. We show that the policy function of the European Central Bank (ECB) is described by a nonlinear Taylor rule. Then, using our estimations, we show that around the liquidity trap steady state the equilibrium is locally determinate for most plausible parameter values. Finally, we find that an inflation shock is more efficient than a demand shock to escape the liquidity trap steady state.

This paper presents a continuous time stochastic growth model to study the effects of tax evasion and tax corruption on the level and volatility of private investment and public spending that are both factors of growth. The model highlights several channels through which the mean and volatility of these variables are affected. We first stress the role of equity markets, showing that the evasion outcome for the private sector is not necessarily viewed as a burden. Equity market performs here have the same role as a policy of tax exemption. In societies in which the share of private investment in percentage of GDP is growing, in which tax cheaters usually choose to shelter the proceeds of their illegal activities from the official financial institutions, and in which the productivity of public spending is often low, tax evasion and tax corruption may contribute to the development of private capital if people find an opportunity to invest the proceeds of their illegal activities in equity markets.

This paper tries to identify the macro-financial imbalances that exposed the euro area countries to fiscal stress before the outbreak of the European debt crises. Contrary to conventional wisdom that interprets fiscal stress in terms of fiscal sustainability, we focus on short-term fiscal vulnerability as reflected by the conditions of debt refinancing in the sovereign bond markets. We find that market-based indicators capturing risk perceptions of sovereign debts have been influenced by the indicators defined in the European Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) and by variables of financial vulnerability. When pricing the risk of sovereign bonds, the holders of government debts take into account, not only the macroeconomic imbalances, but also factors such as banking distress, corporate bond risk, liquidity risks in the interbank market or the volatility of stock prices.

This paper provides evidence of various reactions of growth rates to changes in the composition of taxes and public spending in Europe. We use a quantile estimator to allow different slopes of fiscal variables, across countries and years. We find that sovereign spending should be encouraged in the medium term if growth is low, but the medium-term effect on the economic activity is not positive in situations of moderate or rapid growth. Human capital expenditure jeopardizes growth, if a country belongs to the group of under-performers, while the initial costs are progressively transformed into growth-friendly factors for the group of over-achievers. Welfare expenditure is unproductive in the medium term, but only above a given growth threshold. Higher direct taxes are more harmful for low-growth countries, since their effects are more persistent than for countries with high growth. Our findings are contrary the idea that one size fits all.