Marc Sangnier
Chercheur
,
Aix-Marseille Université
, Faculté d'économie et de gestion (FEG)
- Statut
- Professeur des universités
- Domaine(s) de recherche
- Économie publique
- Thèse
- 2012, Paris School of Economics, EHESS
- Téléchargement
- CV
- Adresse
Maison de l'économie et de la gestion d'Aix
424 chemin du viaduc, CS80429
13097 Aix-en-Provence Cedex 2
Stéphane Benveniste, Renaud Coulomb, Marc Sangnier, Documents de travail du Centre d'Économie de la Sorbonne, 12/2025
Résumé
State awards to civilians are a widespread social phenomenon across space and time. This paper provides a quantification of the impact of State awards given to Directors on the stock value of their firms. We link a comprehensive dataset of recipients of the Légion d'honneur-the most prestigious official award in France-over the 1995-2019 period to Board positions in French listed firms. We document positive abnormal returns in the stocks of recipients' firms at the date of the award. This finding does not apply to those previously identified as politically connected through shared education in elite graduate schools; rather, it is driven by recipients for whom the awards newly signal a valuable access to policy-makers, establishing State awards as a new indicator of political connections.
Mots clés
Awards, State Honors, Symbolic Capital, Political connections
Brice Fabre, Marc Sangnier, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 241, pp. 105276, 12/2024
Résumé
This paper uses French data to simultaneously estimate the impact of two types of connections on government subsidies allocated to municipalities. Investigating different types of connection in a same setting helps to distinguish between the different motivations that could drive pork-barreling. We differentiate between municipalities where ministers held office before their appointment to the government and those where they lived as children. Exploiting ministers' entries into and exits from the government, we show that municipalities where a minister was mayor receive 30% more investment subsidies when the politician they are linked to joins the government, and a similar size decrease when the minister departs. In contrast, we do not observe these outcomes for municipalities where ministers lived as children. These findings indicate that altruism toward childhood friends and family does not fuel pork-barreling, and suggest that altruism toward adulthood social relations or career concerns matter. We also present complementary evidence suggesting that observed porkbarreling is the result of soft influence of ministers, rather than of their formal control over the administration they lead.✩ This paper was previously circulated under the titles ''What motivates French pork: Political career concerns or private connections?'' and ''The returns from private and political connections: New evidence from French municipalities''. We greatly appreciated comments and suggestions from three anonymous reviewers, the Editor,
Mots clés
Personal connections, Political connections, Distributive politics, Local favoritism
Julieta Peveri, Marc Sangnier, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 214, pp. 574-594, 10/2023
Résumé
This paper studies differences across genders in the re-contesting decisions of politicians following electoral wins or defeats. Using close races in mixed-gender French local elections, we show that women are less likely to persist in competition when they lose compared to male runners-up, but are equally or more prone than male winners to re-contest when they win. Differences in observable characteristics or in the expected electoral returns of running again cannot fully account for these gender gaps in persistence. In contrast, evidence suggests that results are driven by behavioural explanations such as cross-gender differences in candidates' attitudes toward competition, or by political parties behaving differently toward female and male candidates for a given electoral outcome. Additionally, we provide evidence that a woman's victory encourages former female challengers to re-contest but does not trigger the entry of new female candidates.
Mots clés
Elections, Self-selection, Candidates, Persistence, Competition, Gender
Guilhem Cassan, Marc Sangnier, Journal of Population Economics, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp. 963-988, 07/2022
Résumé
Soon after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, the French government decided to still hold the first round of the 2020 municipal elections as scheduled on March 15. What was the impact of these elections on the spread of COVID-19 in France? Answering this question leads to intricate econometric issues as omitted variables may drive both epidemiological dynamics and electoral turnout, and as a national lockdown was imposed at almost the same time as the elections. In order to disentangle the effect of the elections from that of confounding factors, we first predict each department’s epidemiological dynamics using information up to the election. We then take advantage of differences in electoral turnout across departments to identify the impact of the election on prediction errors in hospitalizations. We report a detrimental effect of the first round of the election on hospitalizations in locations that were already at relatively advanced stages of the epidemic. Estimates suggest that the elections accounted for at least 3,000 hospitalizations, or 11% of all hospitalizations by the end of March. Given the sizable health cost of holding elections during an epidemic, promoting ways of voting that reduce exposure to COVID-19 is key until the pandemic shows signs of abating.
Mots clés
Prediction errors, Municipal elections, Electoral turnout, Hospitalizations, COVID-19, Prediction errors
Kentaro Asai, Thomas Breda, Audrey Rain, Lucile Romanello, Marc Sangnier, pp. 114 p., 01/2020
Résumé
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSThis work was done in the context of a research partnership between theInstitutdes politiques publiquesand theDirection de l’Animation de la Recherche, des Etudeset des Statistiques(Dares) at the French Ministry of Labor. We thank the Dares forits financial support that made it possible to realise this study.Our partners at the Dares have also provided several suggestions that dramat-ically improved the quality of the report. We would like to thank in particular fortheir useful feedback Cécile Ballini, Mathilde Gaini and Philippe Zamora. We alsothank them warmly for their patience and flexibility throughout the project.We then thank warmly the IPP team for constant support with the project. Weare particularly grateful to Julien Grenet as he suggested the central idea that isinvestigated in Chapter 4 of this report, and provided insightful comments through-out the project. Marion Monnet also deserves to be thanked for participating in themanagement of the project at its initial stage, and helping throughout.This report was written after the organization by the Dares and the IPP of aworking group on skills and skill mismatch. We would like to thank all participantsand their institutions for their feedback when we presented preliminary versionsof our work to the group. We also thank the OECD which allowed us to access aslightly enriched version of the PIAAC data, which was very useful to undertake theanalyses presented in the report.
Marc Sangnier, Yanos Zylberberg, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 152, No. C, pp. 55-67, 08/2017
Résumé
This paper provides empirical evidence that, after protests, citizens substantially revise their views on the current leader, but also their trust in the country's institutions. The empirical strategy exploits variation in the timing of an individual level survey and the proximity to social protests in 13 African countries. First, we find that trust in political leaders strongly and abruptly decreases after protests. Second, trust in the country monitoring institutions plunges as well. Both effects are much stronger when protests are repressed by the government. As no signs of distrust are recorded even a couple of days before the social conflicts, protests can be interpreted as sudden signals sent on a leaders' actions from which citizens extract information on their country fundamentals.
Mots clés
Leaders, Institutions, Trust, Protests
Mathieu Couttenier, Pauline Grosjean, Marc Sangnier, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 558--585, 07/2017
Résumé
We document interpersonal violence as a dimension of the resource curse. We rely on a historical natural experiment in the United States, where mineral discoveries occurred sometimes before, sometimes after formal institutions were established in the county of discovery. In places where mineral discoveries occurred before formal institutions were established, there were more homicides per capita historically and the effect has persisted to this day. Today, the share of homicides and assaults explained by the historical circumstances of mineral discoveries is comparable to the effect of education or income. Our results imply that short-term and quasi-exogenous variations in the institutional environment can lead to large and persistent differences in cultural and institutional development.
Mots clés
Economie quantitative
Morgan Raux, Marc Sangnier, Tanguy van Ypersele, Economics Bulletin, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 347-351, 02/2017
Résumé
This note evaluates the scrambled questions penalty using multiple choice tests taken by first-year undergraduate students who follow a microeconomics introductory course. We provide new evidence that students perform worse at scrambled questionnaires than at logically ordered ones. We improve on previous studies by explicitly modeling students individual skills thanks to a fixed effects regression. We further show that the scrambled questions penalty does not differ along gender but varies along the distribution of students' skills and mostly affects students with lower-intermediate skills.
Mots clés
Student performance, Scrambled questions, Multiple choice tests
Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc, Marc Sangnier, The Economic Journal, Vol. 126, No. 593, pp. 861--883, 06/2016
Résumé
We show the existence of a twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state that stems from two opposing forces. Uncivic people support large welfare states because they expect to benefit from them without bearing their costs. But civic individuals support generous benefits and high taxes only when they are surrounded by trustworthy individuals. We provide empirical evidence for these behaviors and this twin peaks relation in the OECD countries.
Mots clés
Economie quantitative
Abel Brodeur, Mathias Lé, Marc Sangnier, Yanos Zylberberg, American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 1-32, 01/2016
Résumé
Using 50,000 tests published in the AER, JPE, and QJE, we identify a residual in the distribution of tests that cannot be explained solely by journals favoring rejection of the null hypothesis. We observe a two-humped camel shape with missing p-values between 0.25 and 0.10 that can be retrieved just after the 0.05 threshold and represent 10-20 percent of marginally rejected tests. Our interpretation is that researchers inflate the value of just-rejected tests by choosing "significant" specifications. We propose a method to measure this residual and describe how it varies by article and author characteristics.
Mathieu Couttenier, Marc Sangnier, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 243-256, 05/2015
Résumé
This paper provides empirical evidence that mineral resources abundance is associated to preferences for redistribution in the United States. We show that individuals living in states with large mineral resources endowment are more opposed to redistribution than others. We take advantage of both the spatial and the temporal distributions of mineral resources discoveries since 1800 to uncover two mechanisms through which mineral resources can foster ones’ opposition to redistribution: either by transmission of values formed in the past, or by the exposure to mineral discoveries during individuals’ life-time. We show that both mechanisms matter to explain respondents’ preferences.
Mots clés
Redistribution, Persistence, Mineral resources
Renaud Coulomb, Marc Sangnier, Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 115, No. C, pp. 158-170, 01/2014
Résumé
This paper simultaneously estimates the impact of political majorities on the values of firms that would benefit from the platforms of the two main candidates at the 2007 French presidential election, Ségolène Royal and Nicolas Sarkozy, and of those that are ruled or owned by Sarkozy's friends. We use prediction-market data to track each candidate's victory probability, and investigate how this relates to firms' abnormal returns. Our estimates suggest that the value of firms that would likely benefit from the platforms of Royal and Sarkozy changed by 1% and 2%, respectively, with the candidates' victory probabilities, and that firms connected to Sarkozy out-performed others by 3% due to his election.
Mots clés
Political majority, Prediction markets, Political connections, Abnormal returns, Firm value, Political majority
Brice Fabre, Marc Sangnier
Résumé
This paper uses French data to simultaneously estimate the impact of two types of connections on government subsidies allocated to municipalities. Investigating different types of connection in a same setting helps to distinguish between the different motivations that could drive pork-barreling. We differentiate between municipalities where ministers held office before their appointment to the government and those where they lived as children. Exploiting ministers' entries into and exits from the government, we show that municipalities where a minister was mayor receive 30% more investment subsidies when the politician they are linked to joins the government, and a similar size decrease when the minister departs. In contrast, we do not observe these outcomes for municipalities where ministers lived as children. These findings indicate that altruism towards childhood friends and family does not fuel pork-barreling, and suggest that altruism toward adulthood social relations or career concerns matter. We also present complementary evidence suggesting that observed pork-barreling is the result of soft influence of ministers, rather than of their formal control over the administration they lead.
Mots clés
Personal connections, Political connections, Distributive politics, Local favouritism
Stéphane Benveniste, Renaud Coulomb, Marc Sangnier
Résumé
State awards to civilians are a widespread social phenomenon across space and time. This paper quantifies the impact of State awards given to Directors on the stock value of their firms. We link a comprehensive dataset of recipients of the Légion d'honneurthe most prestigious official award in France-over the 1995-2019 period to Board positions in French listed firms. We document large abnormal returns in the stocks of recipients' firms at the date of the award, suggesting that awards signal valuable access to policy-makers. This interpretation is corroborated by the absence of any market reaction for recipients who were already identified before award receipt as being close to the Government.
Mots clés
Political connections, Symbolic Capital, State Honors, Awards
Julieta Peveri, Marc Sangnier
Résumé
This paper studies differences across genders in the re-contesting decisions of politicians following electoral wins or defeats. Using close races in mixed-gender French local elections, we show that women are less likely to persist in competition when they lose compared to male runners-up, but are equally or more prone than male winners to re-contest when they win. Differences in observable characteristics or in the expected electoral returns of running again cannot fully account for these gender gaps in persistence. In contrast, the heterogeneity of the results across political ideology, age, experience and occupation suggests that behavioural explanations are at play. Additionally, we provide evidence that a woman's victory encourages former female challengers to re-contest but does not trigger the entry of new female candidates.
Mots clés
Self-selection, Elections, Candidates, Persistence, Competition, Gender
Guilhem Cassan, Marc Sangnier
Résumé
On March 15, about 20, 000, 000 voters cast their vote for the first round of the 2020 French municipal elections. We investigate the extent to which this event contributed to the COVID-19 epidemics in France. To this end, we first predict each département's own dynamics using information up to the election to calibrate a standard logistic model. We then take advantage of electoral turnout differences between départements to distinguish the impact of the election on prediction errors in hospitalizations from that of simultaneously implemented anti-contagion policies. We report a detrimental effect of the election in locations that were at relatively advanced stages of the epidemics by the time of the election. In contrast, we show that the election did not contribute to the epidemics in départements with lower infection levels by March 15. All in all, our estimates suggest that elections accounted for about 4, 000 excess hospitalizations by the end of March, which represents 15% of all hospitalizations by this time. They also suggest that holding elections in June may not be as detrimental.
Mots clés
COVID-19, Hospitalizations, Electoral turnout, Municipal elections, Prediction errors
Brice Fabre, Marc Sangnier
Résumé
This paper uses the detailed curricula of French ministers and the detailed accounts of French municipalities to identify governmental investment grants targeted to specific jurisdictions. We distinguish between municipalities in which a politician held office before being appointed as a government’s member and those in which current ministers lived during their childhood. We provide evidence that municipalities in which a minister held office during her career experience a 45% increase in the amount of discretionary investment subsidies they receive during the time the politician they are linked to serves as minister. In contrast, we do not find any evidence that subsidies flow to municipalities from which ministers originate. Additional evidence advocate in favour of a key role of network and knowledge accumulated through connections, illustrated by a persistence of the impact of intergovernmental ties.
Mots clés
Pork-barrel economics, Distributive politics, Political connections, Private connections
Morgan Raux, Marc Sangnier, Tanguy van Ypersele
Résumé
This note evaluates the scrambled questions penalty using multiple choice tests taken by first-year undergraduate students who follow a microeconomics introductory course. We provide new evidence that students perform worse at scrambled questionnaires than at logically ordered ones. We improve on previous studies by explicitly modeling students individual skills thanks to a fixed effects regression. We further show that the scrambled questions penalty does not differ along gender but varies along the distribution of students’ skills and mostly affects students with lower-intermediate skills.
Mots clés
Multiple choice tests, Scrambled questions, Student performance
Thomas Bourveau, Renaud Coulomb, Marc Sangnier
Résumé
This paper investigates whether political connections affect individuals’ propensity to engage in illegal activities in financial markets. We use the 2007 French presidential election as marker of change in the value of political connections, in a difference-in-differences research design. We examine the behavior of directors of publicly listed companies who are connected to the future president through campaign donations or direct friendships, relative to that of other non-connected directors, before and after the election. We uncover indirect evidence that connected directors do more illegal insider trading after the election. More precisely, we find that purchases by connected directors trigger larger abnormal returns, and that connected directors are more likely not to comply with trading disclosure requirements and to trade closer to major corporate events.
Mots clés
Political connections, White-collar crime, Insider trading
Mathieu Couttenier, Pauline Grosjean, Marc Sangnier
Résumé
We document interpersonal violence as a dimension of the resource curse. We rely on a historical natural experiment in the United States, where mineral discoveries occurred sometimes before, sometimes after formal institutions were established in the county of discovery. In places where mineral discoveries occurred before formal institutions were established, there were more homicides per capita historically and the effect has persisted to this day. Today, the share of homicides and assaults explained by the historical circumstances of mineral discoveries is comparable to the effect of education or income. Our results imply that short-term and quasi-exogenous variations in the institutional environment can lead to large and persistent differences in cultural and institutional development.
Mots clés
US, Mineral discoveries, Homicide, Resource curse
Abel Brodeur, Mathias Lé, Marc Sangnier, Yanos Zylberberg
Résumé
Journals favor rejection of the null hypothesis. This selection upon tests may distort the behavior of researchers. Using 50,000 tests published between 2005 and 2011 in the AER, JPE, and QJE, we identify a residual in the distribution of tests that cannot be explained by selection. The distribution of p-values exhibits a two humped camel shape with abundant p-values above 0.25, a valley between 0.25 and 0.10, and a bump slightly below 0.05. The missing tests (with p-values between 0.25 and 0.10) can be retrieved just after the 0.05 threshold and represent 10% to 20% of marginally rejected tests. Our interpretation is that researchers might be tempted to inflate the value of those just-rejected tests by choosing a “significant” specification. We propose a method to measure this residual and describe how it varies by article and author characteristics.
Mots clés
Hypothesis testing, Distorting incentives, Selection bias, Research in economics
Mathieu Couttenier, Marc Sangnier
Résumé
This paper provides empirical evidence that mineral resources abundance is associated to preferences for redistribution in the United States. We show that individuals living in states with large mineral resources endowment are more opposed to redistribution than others. We take advantage of both the spatial and the temporal distributions of mineral resources discoveries since 1800 to uncover two mechanisms through which mineral resources can foster ones’ opposition to redistribution: either by transmission of values formed in the past, or by the exposure to mineral discoveries during individuals’ life-time. We show that both mechanisms matter to explain respondents’ preferences.
Mots clés
Persistence, Redistribution, Mineral resources
Yann Algan, Pierre Cahuc, Marc Sangnier
Résumé
We show the existence of a twin peaks relation between trust and the size of the welfare state that stems from two opposing forces. Uncivic people support large welfare states because they expect to benefit from them without bearing their costs. But civic individuals support generous benefits and high taxes only when they are surrounded by trustworthy individuals. We provide empirical evidence for these behaviors and this twin peaks relation in the OECD countries.
Mots clés
Welfare state, Trust, Civism, Corruption, Redistribution
Marc Sangnier
Résumé
This note describes the Stata command alloch which helps to allocate exclusive choices among individuals who have ordered preferences over available alternatives.
Mots clés
Alloch, Random allocation, Choice criterion
Marc Sangnier, Yanos Zylberberg
Résumé
Leaders' misbehaviors may durably undermine the credibility of the state. Using individual level survey in the aftermath of geo-localized social protests in Africa, we find that trust in monitoring institutions and beliefs in social coordination strongly evolve after riots, together with trust in leaders. As no signs of social unrest can be recorded before, the social conflict can be interpreted as a sudden signal sent on a leader's action from which citizens extract information on the country's institutions. Our interpretation is the following. Agents lend their taxes to a leader with imperfect information on the leader's type and the underlying capacity of institutions to monitor her. A misbehavior is then interpreted as a failure of institutions to secure taxes given by citizens and makes agents (i) reluctant to contribute to the state effort, (ii) skeptical about the contributions of others.
Mots clés
Social conflicts, Norms of cooperation, Trust, Institutions