Publications

Résumé [Eng] Housing is a crucial good for households, both as a consumer good via the flow of services it fosters, and as an essential component of a homeowner’s wealth. It is also crucial because it accounts for more than a quarter of household’s expenses, and an increase in rent or property prices instantly has a major impact on their living standards, choice of location, mobility, and savings options. Finally, housing is also crucial because it is unique as an element of space‑time, space and time that cannot be separated in this instance. These themes are examined in this special issue, with a variety of approaches and different perspectives, providing valuable information on a number of outstanding issues.
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Résumé In this paper, we study the production and dissemination of public knowledge goods, such as technological knowledge, generated by a network of voluntarily cooperating innovators. We develop a private-collective model of public knowledge production in networked innovation systems, where group-based social preferences have an impact on the coalition formation of developers. Our model builds on the large empirical literature on voluntary production of pooled public knowledge goods, including source code in communities of software developers or data provided to open access data repositories. Our analysis shows under which conditions social preferences, such as ‘group belonging’ or ‘peer approval’, influence the stable coalition size, as such rationalising several stylized facts emerging from large-scale surveys of open-source software developers, previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, heterogeneity of social preferences is added to the model to study the formation of stable but mixed coalitions.
Mots clés Coalition formation, Networked innovation, Open-source software OSS, Public knowledge goods, Private-collective model, Social preferences
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Résumé Cet article traite des formes de solidarité sociale nouvelles qui émergent aujourd’hui dans le double contexte d’accentuation des inégalités socio-spatiales et d’altération du système français de solidarité nationale. Nous analysons les conditions qui font que ce système devient de plus en plus inopérant face à des situations d’inégalité d’une diversité croissante, à la fois multiscalaires, multifactorielles et cumulatives. En nous appuyant sur une approche théorique en termes de proximité, et en nous référant aux situations largement évoquées aujourd’hui dans la littérature, nous mettons en évidence les conditions qui favorisent désormais l’apparition de « communs sociaux ». Nous montrons en quoi ces communs se distinguent des modalités anciennes de solidarité communautaire. Nous soulignons enfin à quelles conditions ces communs sont susceptibles de constituer des réponses justes et durables à l’accentuation actuelle des inégalités sociales.
Mots clés Communs sociaux, Communs territoriaux, Proximité, Solidarité, Inégalités, France
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Résumé This paper estimates the effects of an increase in the share of the real estate transfer taxes (RETT) rates going to the French départements from 3.80% to 4.50%. Not all the départe-ments voted the RETT increase on the same date, which is the starting point of a natural experiment. Using a difference-indifferences design, we estimate two main effects. (1) An anticipation effect, one month before the implementation of the reform, in order to avoid the RETT increase. (2) A retention effect in the post-reform period. In the end, the net effect (retention minus anticipation) corresponds to an average drop in transactions of around 6% over the first three months after the reform, that is, approximately 15,000 transactions lost at national level. If we find a short term effect of the reform, we do not find evidence of a medium-or long-term effect.
Mots clés Natural experiment, Transfer taxes, Real estate market, Local government, Natural experiment
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Résumé We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences, where workers and consumers are differentiated, respectively, by their sensitivity to effort and their intensity of preference for quality. We consider a monopoly of which the shares are owned by a fraction of the general population. The price is determined through a vote among all the shareholders. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for (i) an absolute (relative) majority to vote for the profit maximizing price; (ii) an absolute (relative) majority to vote for a different price. We argue that the more concentrated the ownership the more likely it is that the firm charges the profit-maximizing price.
Mots clés General equilibrium, Profit maximization, Vertical preferences, Majority vote
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Résumé A sizable literature has established the positive impact of social infrastructure on economic development, but the determinants of social infrastructure itself have yet to be fully explored. Competing theories suggest a variety of political institutions as driving forces of social infrastructure, but the empirical literature has been hampered by the small set of available proxies, many of which are broadly defined. We leverage a new, comprehensive dataset that codes political institutions directly from countries’ constitutions. By employing a statistical methodology that is designed to juxtapose candidate regressors associated with many competing theories, we test each individual political institution's effect on social infrastructure. Our results show that constitutional rules pertaining to executive constraints as well as to the structure of electoral systems are crucial for the development of high-quality social infrastructure. We also find that the determinants of social infrastructure are much more fundamental than previously thought: not only the general structure of electoral systems matter, but also highly detailed aspects such as limits on campaign contributions and the freedom to form parties. Moreover, the granularity of our data allows us to highlight the profound effect of basic human rights on social infrastructure, a dimension which has not been explored in the literature to date.
Mots clés Bayesian Model Averaging, Social Infrastructure, Institutions, Constitutions
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Résumé We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.
Mots clés Oath, Cheap talk communication, Coordination game
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Résumé This paper studies the transfer problem in a model featuring comparative advantage, mo-nopolistic competition, trade costs, and firm heterogeneity in factor intensity. The results are very different from those of the previous literature. First, a transfer creates a secondary burden in situations where the neoclassical version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model would not. Second, a transfer affects wage inequality. Third, a transfer is not neutral to world welfare. Fourth, floating exchange rates do not substitute for deflation. Fifth, a simulation exercise shows that the quantitative effects of trade imbalances are comparable in magnitude to those arising from major trade agreements.
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