AMU - AMSE
5-9 Boulevard Maurice Bourdet, CS 50498
13205 Marseille Cedex 1
No abstract is available for this item.
This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of centrality. We first characterize both dominant and dominated equilibria. Second, we examine the issue of social coordination in order to reduce the social dilemma.
We consider a model in which a firm faces two types of liquidity risks: a Brownian risk and a Poisson risk. The firm chooses a dividend policy to maximize shareholder value. We characterize the optimal firm value and we show that the optimal dividend policy is a barrier strategy: the firm keeps cash inside when the cash reserves level is less than a critical threshold and pays cash in excess of this threshold. We also analyze the problem of insurance against the Poisson risk. We find that it is optimal for the firm to buy full insurance when its cash reserves are above a critical threshold and not to insure otherwise.
We analyze in this paper the interaction between financing and investment decisions in presence of debt issuance costs. We find that, while debt issuance costs reduce tax shields, tax shields induce a higher investment trigger. Moreover, the investment trigger is a non-monotonic function of the borrowing capacity. Indeed, as credit constraints relax, entrepreneurs with small debt capacity speed up investment to exploit tax shields, whereas those with large debt capacity postpone investment to minimize default risk.