Deroïan

Publications

Endogenous effort in communication networks under strategic complementarityJournal articleMohamed Belhaj and Frédéric Deroian, International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 39, Issue 3, pp. 391-408, 2010

This article explores individual incentives to produce information on communication networks. In our setting, efforts are strategic complements along communication paths with convex decay. We analyze Nash equilibria on a set of networks which are unambiguous in terms of centrality. We first characterize both dominant and dominated equilibria. Second, we examine the issue of social coordination in order to reduce the social dilemma.

Endogenous link strength in directed communication networksJournal articleFrédéric Deroian, Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 57, Issue 1, pp. 110-116, 2009

We study the formation of a directed communication network in which agents distribute a fixed amount of resource over links. Indirect benefits transit through the path maximizing the product of link strength. In this environment, the wheel architecture is shown to be both the unique efficient and the unique Nash architecture.

Dissemination of spillovers in cost-reducing alliancesJournal articleFrédéric Deroian, Research in Economics, Volume 62, Issue 1, pp. 34-44, 2008

Firms raise cost-reducing alliances before competing with each other, but cannot fully appropriate the shared knowledge. When spillovers disseminate through the network of alliances, link formation enables firms to capture more spillovers, but by doing so they become intermediary in the spreading of spillovers to other firms. This leads to the emergence of asymmetric networks.

Quality-improving alliances in differentiated oligopolyJournal articleFrédéric Deroian and Frédéric Gannon, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Volume 24, Issue 3, pp. 629-637, 2006

We study rival firms' incentives in quality-improving Research and Development (R&D) networks. The analysis stresses the role of free riding associated to collaboration and three major consequences emerge: R&D efforts decrease with the number of partners, networks of alliances are over-connected as compared to the social optimum and the profitmaximizing number of alliances is possibly non monotonic (decreasing then increasing) with respect to inverse measure of product differentiation.

Formation of a Communication Network Under Perfect ForesightJournal articleFrédéric Deroian, Theory and Decision, Volume 61, Issue 3, pp. 191-204, 2006

We study the formation of a communication network under perfect foresight. We show the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between the cost of link formation and the total number of links created in stable networks. This result enhances a dilemma between stable and efficient networks. Copyright Springer 2006

A Note on Cost-Reducing Alliances in Vertically Differentiated OligopolyJournal articleFrédéric Deroian, Economics Bulletin, Volume 12, Issue 11, pp. 1-6, 2004

In a vertically differentiated oligopoly, firms raise cost-reducing alliances before competing with each other. It is shown that heterogeneity in quality and in cost functions reduces individual incentives to form links. Furthermore, both differentiated Cournot and Bertrand competition qualitatively similar incitations to form alliances.

Comportements collectifs dans les réseaux dinfluence socialeJournal articleFrédéric Deroian, Annals of Economics and Statistics, Issue 74, pp. 209-224, 2004

We explore collective behaviors in a deterministic mode of interacting agents. We relate unanimity of diversity to the structura conditions of the interaction network.

Farsighted strategies in the formation of a communication networkJournal articleFrédéric Deroian, Economics Letters, Volume 80, Issue 3, pp. 343-349, 2003

No abstract is available for this item.

Apprentissage social et diffusion de l'innovation : réseaux critiques et intermédiaritéJournal articleJean-Benoît Zimmermann, Alexandre Steyer and Frédéric Deroian, Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Volume 103, Issue 1, pp. 71-89, 2003

eng] The role of social networks in innovation diffusion remains a strategic question. In former works, we have introduced a relational learning, based on hebbian rule, that leads to a critical state, in which few agents reach structural positions of opinion leaders. In this paper, we show that the self-organization of an influence network, through social learning, is not a monotonie process, from the point of view of structural characteristics as well as of its diffusion performances. The notion of intermediarity, which derives directly from the concept of network, appears necessary to decrypt this evolution. By introducing the role of "weak ties" in the diverse diffusion regimes it is then possible to bring a new understan-ding of the phenomenon.
[fre] Le rôle des réseaux sociaux dans la diffusion de l'innovation demeure une question stratégique. Dans des travaux antérieurs, nous avons introduit un apprentissage relationnel, de type hebbien, qui conduit à un état critique, dans lequel certains agents acquièrent des positions, purement structurelles, de leaders d'opinion. Dans cet article, nous montrons que l'auto-organisation d'un réseau d'influence, par l'effet d'un apprentissage social, ne constitue pas un phénomène monotone, aussi bien du point de vue des caractéristiques structurelles du réseau que de celui de ses performances en diffusion. Ceci nécessite, pour être analysé, de recourir à la notion d'intermédiarité qui est inhérente au concept de réseau. Une analyse relative au rôle des "liens faibles" dans les différents régimes de diffusion devrait alors permettre d'offrir un éclairage nouveau sur cette dynamique d'évolution.

Le dilemme stabilité-efficacité dans les réseaux stratégiques : quelques éléments de littératureJournal articleFrédéric Deroian, Revue d'Économie Industrielle, Volume 103, Issue 1, pp. 155-174, 2003

[eng] A recent literature studies economic situations where agents have to form links with others for strategic goals. A major contribution in this field is the focus on dilemmas between stable networks - in the sense of strategie interests - and efficient networks - in the sense of maximization of a global criterion, as the sum of individual payoffs. This article presents the general dilemmas and the contexts in which they disappear.
[fre] Une littérature récente étudie des situations économiques où des agents sont amenés à former des relations avec d'autres dans un but stratégique. Un apport essentiel de ces contributions est l'existence de dilemmes entre réseaux stables au sens de l'intérêt stratégique de chacun et réseaux efficaces, au sens de la maximisation d'un critère global quelconque (comme la somme des paiements individuels). Cet article expose les dilemmes généraux entre réseaux stratégiques stables et efficaces tels qu'ils existent dans cette littérature, ainsi que les possibilités de résolution qui ont pu suivre.