Hanoteau

Publications

The silence on climate change by accounting's top journals.Journal articleJulien Hanoteau, Alistair M. Brown, Isabelle Pignatel and Bernard Paranque, International Journal of Climate Change: Impacts and Responses, Volume 1, Issue 4, pp. 81-100, 2009

The purpose of this article is to examine the contribution made to climate change issues by the elite 'top 5' international accounting journals of Accounting Organizations and Society, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting Research and The Accounting Review, for the period 2000-2005. The main methodological approach used in this study is textual analysis which attempts to discern the underlying climate change discourse and ideology of these 'high quality' accounting journals' accounting articles. The contribution made by these 'top 5' accounting journals amounts to nine journal articles and three research notes. While the articles of Herbohn (2005) and Gray (2002) break the pattern of 'top 5' ritualistic capital market based climate change accounting publications, the absence of a contemporary wide-ranging number of environmental accounting research articles by these 'high quality' journals underlies the 'top 5' accounting academia's complicity in the status quo of denial about the planet's problems.

Competitiveness through political environmental strategies: The case of Michelin's green tiresJournal articleJulien Hanoteau, Global Business and Organizational Excellence, Volume 29, Issue 1, pp. 32-40, 2009

There is a debate as to whether green firms may become economically more competitive, as well. The answer appears circumstantial, depending on the abilities of these firms to implement and benefit from environmental competitive strategies such as environmental differentiation or eco-efficiency. This article discusses corporate political strategies, targeting environmental regulations, as another source of competitiveness. Based on the case of Michelin's green tires, we characterize this strategy and its conduct, and analyze the conditions for its success. We show that it was the necessary complement to the environmental differentiation strategy developed and implemented by Michelin since the early 1990s. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Lobbying pour les permis négociables et non-neutralité du mode d'allocationJournal articleJulien Hanoteau, Revue Économique, Volume 55, Issue 3, pp. 517-525, 2004

In an agency model of politics, we show that the choice of an allocation method for tradable emissions permits is not neutral. The decision of a "corrupted" government to auction the permits or to grant them for free affects their equilibrium quantity and price as it modifies the incentive of capital owners of a polluting industry to lobby for or against emissions abatement. Classification JEL : D78, H23, Q28

Lobbying for Emissions Allowances: A New Perspective on the Political Economy of the US Acid Rain Program. (en)Book chapterJulien Hanoteau, In: The role of organized interest groups in policy making, Di Gioacchino al. (Eds.), 2004, pp. 289-311, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

This paper shows empirically that the choice between auction and grandfathering for the distribution of pollution permits is not neutral in presence of political market failures as it motivates rent-seeking. We model the distribution of free permits in the US sulfur emissions trading system as an endogenous sharing rule and we test this relation using PAC contribution as a measure of political influence. We find that shareholder interests of the US power sector influenced the distribution of permits as they were motivated by a windfall gain despite profit regulation in their sector and thanks to a climate of regulatory uncertainty when the law was discussed

Lobbying for Emissions Allowances: A New Perspective on the Political Economy of the US Acid Rain Program.Journal articleJulien Hanoteau, Rivista di Politica Economica, Volume 93, Issue 1, pp. 289-314, 2003

This paper shows empirically that the choice between auction and grandfathering for the distribution of pollution permits is not neutral in presence of political market failures as it motivates rent-seeking. We model the distribution of free permits in the US sulfur emissions trading system as an endogenous sharing rule and we test this relation using PAC contribution as a measure of political influence. We find that shareholder interests of the US power sector influenced the distribution of permits as they were motivated by a windfall gain despite profit regulation in their sector and thanks to a climate of regulatory uncertainty when the law was discussed.