Stahn

Publications

Do Investments in Specialized Knowledge Lead to Composite Good Industries?Journal articleAntoine Soubeyran and Hubert Stahn, Small Business Economics, Volume 29, Issue 1, pp. 119-135, 2007

We try to understand why firms producing goods by means of complementary components do not merge, especially in industries in which investments in component-based knowledge matters. As Audretsch, we state that these activities are developed by “individuals” who do their best to appropriate the return from their knowledge and whose effort is non-contractible. The organization of the industry into firms is identified to a partition of the set of individuals. In this context, we prove that an organization in which each individual hold his own firms is both stable with respect to unilateral deviation and optimal in the line of the property right approach. If the returns are high enough, this structure is even the only one which shares both properties. Copyright Springer 2007

Ordre Lexicographique, Besoins Et Preferences Dans L'Oeuvre De Georgescu-RoegenJournal articleHubert Stahn, Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy, Issue 50, pp. 137-154, 2006

In his paper entitled "Choice, Expectation and Measurability" Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen severely attacked the utility theory by rejecting systematically the so-called Archimedian axiom. His argument strongly relied on the use of lexicographic ordering. However he did not bring the argument to terms. The purpose of this paper is therefore to follow Georgescu- Roegen's point in order to understand why he did not make use of the growing mathematical lattice theory and to see how his attack can be improved by the use of this approach

Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete marketsJournal articleHubert Stahn and Gaël Giraud, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 39, Issue 5-6, pp. 559-583, 2003

No abstract is available for this item.

Network Externalities, Coordination Failures and Non-StandardizationJournal articleHubert Stahn, Annals of Economics and Statistics, Issue 65, pp. 195-218, 2002

In this paper, I show that several standards may survive in markets characterized by network externalities. This result is not explained by strategic choices in an dynamic context. It simply follows from a failure of coordination. In fact, I consider a two stage game. In the first stage, the firms choose their standard. In the second stage, they choose their production levels in markets in which network externalities in the sens of Katz and Shapiro occur. Subgame perfect equilibria characterized by non-standardization exist but are socially inefficient.

Pricing Behaviors on Networks: Some General Results for Two-way NetworksJournal articleAntoine Soubeyran and Hubert Stahn, Journal of Global Optimization, Volume 20, Issue 3-4, pp. 347-373, 2001
A remark on rational expectation equilibria with incomplete markets and real assetsJournal articleHubert Stahn, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 33, Issue 4, pp. 441-448, 2000

No abstract is available for this item.

Quelques réflexions sur la formation stratégique des prix dans un contexte d'équilibre généralJournal articleHubert Stahn, Cahiers d’économie politique / Papers in Political Economy, Volume 37, Issue 1, pp. 225-255, 2000

[eng] This paper is devoted to the study of the price formation in a context of general equilibrium. In fact, I try to understand how the works on imperfect competition improve this field. This is why I progressively review the contributions of the standard monopoly theory, of the monopolistic competition approach and of the standard general equilibrium theory. Several models are presented in this paper in which I progressively increase the degree of rationality of price maker by moving from a subjective to an objective perception of the demand. In each case, I also briefly discuss the existence conditions. [fre] L'objectif de ce travail est de s'intéresser à la formation stratégique des prix dans un contexte d'équilibre général et de comprendre dans quelle mesure les travaux sur la concurrence imparfaite ont contribué à faire progresser la recherche sur ce thème. Cela m'amènera à passer en revue les apports de la théorie du monopole, des modélisations de la concurrence monopolistique et enfin de la théorie de l'équilibre général. Ces différentes approches me permettront de présenter plusieurs modélisations d'un équilibre général de concurrence monopolistique reposant sur des hypothèses alternatives quant au degré de rationalité des anticipations de demande des monopoles. Dans chaque cas, j'évoquerai également les problèmes posés par la modélisation et je discuterai des conditions d'existence de ces équilibres.

Monopolistic behaviors and general equilibrium: a generalization of Nikaido's workJournal articleHubert Stahn, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 32, Issue 1, pp. 87-112, 1999

No abstract is available for this item.

On monopolistic equilibria with incomplete markets: the case of an exchange economyJournal articleHubert Stahn, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 29, Issue 1, pp. 83-107, 1998

No abstract is available for this item.

Does Standardization Really Increase Production?Journal articleHubert Stahn, Annals of Economics and Statistics, Issue 49-50, pp. 381-388, 1998

In market structures with network externalities, it is often asserted that there is a natural tendency toward standardization. In this paper it is argued that incompatible products may survive in static models. Like Katz and Shapiro [1985], I develop a simple multi-product oligopoly in which the demand for one of these commodities increases with the number of agents consuming this good. Instead I introduce a variety of cost functions and discuss the limitations of their results of Katz and Shapiro and exhibit an example that reverses their conclusions.