Ernesto Ugolini*, Ivan Conjeaud**

Séminaires internes
phd seminar

Ernesto Ugolini*, Ivan Conjeaud**

AMSE*, PSE, AMSE**
The General Equilibrium Effect of Trade Shocks: An Empirical Approach*
Recommender systems and efficient social learning**
Co-écrit avec
Priyam Verma*
Lieu

IBD Salle 21

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 21

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Mardi 23 septembre 2025| 11:00 - 12:30
Contact(s)

Alexandre Arnout : alexandre.arnout[at]univ-amu.fr
Philippine Escudié : philippine.escudie[at]univ-amu.fr
Armand Rigotti : armand.rigotti[at]univ-amu.fr

Résumé

*We develop an empirical strategy to estimate the general-equilibrium effects of trade shocks on local labor markets, enabling direct comparison with partial-equilibrium estimates. Using a quantitative trade model, we show that employment responses are fully captured by a market-access measure that incorporates input–output linkages and domestic trade costs. Applying this framework to the China Shock, we quantify changes in market access across 722 U.S. commuting zones and 22 sectors, regress them on exposure to Chinese imports, and trace how the shock propagates through trade and production linkages to generate predicted general-equilibrium effects for each labor market. Accounting for these spillovers reduces the estimated negative effect on manufacturing employment by a factor of 2.5. While upstream contractions amplify the shock through input–output linkages, reductions in domestic competition redirect demand toward less-affected regions, where producers expand. These findings underscore the importance of general-equilibrium and spatial adjustments when assessing the labor-market consequences of globalization.

**In this paper, I study a model of an online platform with a catalog of items whose quality are unknown. Short-lived users arrive in sequence and browse the catalog, paying a small cost each time they want to examine a new alternative. The platform observes their behavior and uses it to deduce information about the items’ quality so as to enhance future user’s experience. I show that the platform is able to distinguish high-quality items if and only if a condition linking the cost of browsing and the thickness of the tail of the distribution from which the quality of the items is drawn holds true. This condition relates to the ability of the platform to incentivize users to explore new items using the information gathered with the previous users. I pin down an easily implementable policy that guarantees efficient learning.