Nandeeta Neerunjun*, Suzanna Khalifa**
Kenza Elass : kenza.elass[at]univ-amu.fr
Camille Hainnaux : camille.hainnaux[at]univ-amu.fr
Daniela Horta Saenz : daniela.horta-saenz[at]univ-amu.fr
Jade Ponsard : jade.ponsard[at]univ-amu.fr
*This paper targets a first-best policy with environmental subsidies which regulate damages due to fossil-fueled electricity and which support investment in renewables-based technologies. Since accommodating the intermittent nature of renewables is central in our work, we even consider that consumers can adapt their demand to electricity supply. We study the feed-in tariff to renewable electricity which is financed by a tax levied on electricity consumption and find that the policy is inefficient. We observe that intermittent renewables result in variable environmental damages. These are not efficiently internalized by a set consumption tax which must also cater for distortion in market electricity prices arising from the feed-in tariff. We then propose to add a carbon tax on emissions and eventually reach a first-best policy. The results surprising suggest that the carbon tax must be set much high and consequently, renewable electricity must also be taxed so that subsidies are instead directed to consumers.
**This study contributes to our understanding of the relationship between female genital cutting (FGC) and the marriage market. FGC is one of the most brutal forms of sexual violence against children, yet more than 200 million women alive today have undergone FGC. While existing studies focus on the role of normative forces, I propose a novel approach in which marriage market returns are a key driver of practice. I developed a model of parental decision to circumcise their daughter and show that in a context where circumcision allows parents to signal desirable but unobservable traits such as chastity, FGC increases the marital surplus receive in the marriage market. I test the model's predictions on Egyptian data and use a difference-in-difference approach to identify the causal effects of FGC on bride price. I exploit the variation across cohorts and villages of women’s parents’ exposure to an anti-FGC campaign broadcasted on the radio in 1994. Village level coverage of the campaign is obtained using an ITM software and archives on radio transmitters. I find that cohorts fully exposed to the campaign are less likely to be circumcised and receive a lower bride price at marriage. Exploring mechanisms, I find additional evidence that FGC increases matching quality in the marriage market. Finally, I find that the practice of bride price is associated with a higher likelihood of being circumcised for women across Africa. Hence, understanding the economic role of FGC is crucial in order design successful policies aimed at its eradication.