This paper presents a model of self-fulfilling expectations by firms and households which generates multiplicity of equilibria in pay and housework time allocation for ex-ante identical spouses. Multiplicity arises from statistical discrimination exerted by firms in the provision of paid-for training to workers, rather than from incentive problems in the labor market. Employers' beliefs about differences in spouses' reactions to housework shocks lead to symmetric (ungendered) and asymmetric (gendered) equilibria. We find that: (1) the ungendered equilibrium tends to prevail as aggregate productivity in the economy increases (regardless of the generosity of family aid policies), (2) the ungendered equilibrium could yield higher welfare under some scenarios, and (3) gender-neutral job subsidies are more effective that gender-targeted ones in removing the gendered equilibrium.

We examine how changes in tax policies affect the dynamics of the distributions of wealth and income in a Ramsey model in which agents differ in their initial capital endowment. The endogeneity of the labor supply plays a crucial role in determining inequality, as tax changes that affect hours of work will affect the distribution of wealth and income, reinforcing or offsetting the direct redistributive impact of taxes. Our results indicate that tax policies that reduce the labor supply are associated with lower output but also with a more equal distribution of after-tax income. We illustrate these effects by examining the impact of recent tax changes observed in the US and in European economies.

A large literature has studied the impact of labour market institutions on wage inequality, but their effect on income inequality has received little attention. This paper argues that personal income inequality depends on the wage differential, the labour share and the unemployment rate. Labour market institutions affect income inequality through these three channels, and their overall effect is theoretically ambiguous. We use a panel of OECD countries for the period 1960-2000 to examine these effects. We find that greater unionization and greater wage bargaining coordination have opposite effects on inequality, implying conflicting effects of greater union presence on income inequality. Copyright (c) The London School of Economics and Political Science 2009.

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