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Mathis Preti

Doctorant Aix-Marseille UniversitéFaculté d'économie et de gestion (FEG)

Preti
Statut
Doctorant
Domaine(s) de recherche
Économie publique
Doctorat
Industrial lobbies and doubt manufacturing using science
Depuis 2023, sous la direction de Yann Bramoullé, Charles Figuières
Téléchargement
CV
Adresse

AMU - AMSE
5-9 Boulevard Maurice Bourdet, CS 50498
​13205 Marseille Cedex 1

Résumé Between 1954 and 1998, the tobacco industry funded more than 1,900 research projects at a total cost of $355 million, on topics such as the roles of heredity and nutrition in cancer. Even though legitimate, this research was intended to divert attention from the harmful effects of tobacco. We provide the first formal analysis of such diversion research. We show that special interests may have strong incentives to affect the scientific agenda, even when the research itself is unbiased. This form of scientific lobbying yields large welfare losses and raises concerns about the private funding of research.
Mots clés Scientific Uncertainty, Scientific lobbying, Private research funding