La plupart des informations présentées ci-dessous ont été récupérées via RePEc avec l'aimable autorisation de Christian Zimmermann
The Labor Share in the Long Term: A Decline?Gilbert Cette, Lorraine Koehl et Thomas Philippon, Economie et Statistique / Economics and Statistics, Issue 510-511-512, pp. 35-51, 2019

We challenge the accepted wisdom of a global secular decline in the labor share. A simple theoretical model is proposed to highlight the main factors of change in the labor share. We document three issues in the existing literature: (i) starting periods for the empirical analysis; (ii) accounting for self employment; and (iii) accounting for residential real estate income. An empirical analysis is carried out since the post war period for France and the United States, and since the 1990s for ten developed countries and on a six country “euro area”. How the three questions above are addressed is crucial to the diagnosis. When the biases that may arise with the three issues mentioned above are eliminated, the labor share in the market sector does not show a general downward or upward trend. The choice of period has a huge impact, as does the treatment of real estate services, whose inclusion or not in the value added can result in significantly different trends.

Sustainable growth and financial markets in a natural resource-rich countryEmma Hooper, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Volume 51, pp. 341-348, 2019

This paper studies the optimal growth path of a natural resource-rich country, which can borrow from international financial markets. I explore to what extent international borrowing can overcome resource scarcity in a small open economy, in order to have sustainable growth. First, a benchmark model with a constant interest rate and technical progress is set up to see if the economy's growth can be sustainable in the long run. Secondly, the case of a debt elastic interest rate is analysed. The main finding of this paper is that borrowing on international capital markets does not permit sustainable growth for a country with exhaustible natural resources, when the interest rate is constant. Nevertheless, when the interest rate is endogenized, the consumption growth rate can be positive before declining.

How to turn crowding-out into crowding-in? An innovative instrument and some law-related examplesAntoine Beretti, Charles Figuières et Gilles Grolleau, European Journal of Law and Economics, Volume 48, Issue 3, pp. 417-438, 2019

Using a simple decision-theoretic approach, we formalize how agents with different kinds of intrinsic motivations react to the introduction of monetary incentives. We contend that empirical results supporting the existence of a crowding-out effect under various legal procedures hide a more complex reality, where some individuals contribute thanks to these additional monetary incentives while others reduce their contributions. Our approach allows us to study the theoretical ability of the self selection mechanism (Mellstrom and Johannesson in J Eur Econ Assoc 6:845-863, 2008; Beretti et al. in Kyklos 66(1):63-77, 2013) to reduce the likelihood to backfire against the cause it is meant to promote. This mechanism consists of a monetary payment for the pro-social behavior and it offers agents the choice to either keep the money for themselves or to direct it to a charity. We show that this legal procedure dominates others more classical procedures because it taps wisely into the motivational heterogeneity of individuals. It uses a self-selection mechanism to match adequate monetary incentives with individuals' types regarding intrinsic motivations. It may even turn a situation subject to crowding-out into a crowding-in outcome.

A Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handoverRaouf Boucekkine, Paolo G. Piacquadio et Fabien Prieur, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Volume 168, pp. 269-291, 2019

We consider an autocracy where the ruling elite control both the resource wealth and education policies. Education prompts economic growth and enriches the budget of the elite. However, education also increases the “awareness of citizens” – capturing their reluctance to accept a dictatorship and their labor market aspirations – and forces the elite to expand redistribution or handover the power. A power handover leads to a more democratic regime, where the elite retains (at least partially) its economic power. This trade-off is the backbone of our Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover. This theory provides new insights on the positive relationship between economic development, education, and democratization, and on the negative relationship between inequality and democratization. Finally, we revisit the resources-curse hypothesis within our setting.

Banking stability, natural disasters, and state fragility: Panel VAR evidence from developing countriesPedro H. Albuquerque et Wassim Rajhi, Research in International Business and Finance, Volume 50, Issue C, pp. 430-443, 2019

Panel VAR methodology is used in this study to empirically evaluate the effects of natural disasters and state fragility on economic and financial dimensions in developing countries such as GDP per capita, banking and financial system deposits, banks’ Z-scores, and non-performing loans. Results based on three panels of up to 66 countries and 17 years of annual data indicate that natural disasters and state fragility may cause significant economic and financial disruption in low-income and middle-income countries. Shocks from natural disasters seem to be temporary and detrimental only to non-performing loans, while shocks from state fragility appear to be permanent and to create detrimental economic and financial feedback loops.

Demystifying China’s Stock Market: The Hidden Logic behind the PuzzlesEric Girardin et Zhenya Liu, Springer Books, 2019-12, Number 978-3-030-17123-0, XXI,125 pages, Springer International Publishing, 2019

Mainstream research has rationalized China’s stock market on the basis of paradigms such as the institutional approach, the efficient market hypothesis, and corporate valuation principles. The deviations from such paradigms have been analyzed as puzzles of China’s stock market. Girardin and Liu explore to what extent, in the perspective of Chinese cultural and historical characteristics, far from being puzzles, these 'deviations’ are rather the symptoms of a consistent strategy for the design, development and regulation of a government-dominated financial system. This book will help investors, observers and researchers understand the hidden logic of the design and functioning of China’s modern stock market, taking a political economy view.

Popper à Vienne. L’éducatrice et son témoinGilles Campagnolo, In: « Versions françaises », 2019-11, pp. 221-302, Rue d'Ulm, 2019
Predicting musculoskeletal disorders risk using tree-based ensemble methodsAlain Paraponaris, A. Ba, Ewen Gallic, Q. Liance et Pierre Michel, European Journal of Public Health, Volume 29, Issue Supplement_4, 2019

Musculoskeletal disorders (MSD) can cause short-term disorders and permanent disabilities which may all result in serious limitations in ac

Apprentissage et découverte : Ecrits de jeunesse (Vienne, 1925-1935)Karl Popper, « Versions françaises », 2019-11, 320 pages, Rue d'Ulm, 2019

Après la publication du Soi et son cerveau (Rue d’Ulm, oct. 2018), ce volume vient clore la publication des œuvres de Popper en langue française (à l’exception de textes datés consacrés quasi exclusivement à la physique quantique). Les écrits de jeunesse montrent la genèse de l’œuvre poppérienne dans une Vienne éducatrice et matrice de savoirs neufs (réforme scolaire, néopsychologie, Cercle de Vienne) au sein d’un milieu cosmopolite progressiste, et l’environnement d’un penseur enthousiaste dans ses premières réalisations. Ils traitent aussi bien de la relation élève-enseignant que du processus de mémorisation, de l’idée de patrie que de l’« expérience vécue de la règle ».

Group targeting under networked synergiesMohamed Belhaj et Frédéric Deroian, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 118, pp. 29-46, 2019

A principal targets agents organized in a network of local complementarities, in order to increase the sum of agents' effort. We consider bilateral public contracts à la Segal (1999). The paper shows that the synergies between contracting and non-contracting agents deeply impact optimal contracts: they can lead the principal to contract with a subset of the agents, and to refrain from contracting with central agents.