La plupart des informations présentées ci-dessous ont été récupérées via RePEc avec l'aimable autorisation de Christian Zimmermann
A note on balanced-budget income taxes and aggregate (in)stability in multi-sector economiesNicolas Abad et Alain Venditti, Macroeconomic Dynamics, pp. 1-20, Forthcoming

We examine the impact of balanced-budget labor income taxes on the existence of expectation-driven business cycles in a two-sector version of the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (SGU) [(1997) Journal of Political Economy 105, 976–1000] model with constant government expenditures and counter-cyclical taxes. Our results show that the destabilizing impact of labor income taxes strongly depends on the capital intensity difference across sectors. Local indeterminacy is indeed more likely when the consumption good sector is capital intensive, as the minimal tax rate decreases, and less likely when the investment good sector is capital intensive, as the minimal tax rate increases. The implication of this result can be quantitatively significant. Indeed, when compared to SGU, local indeterminacy can be either completely ruled out for all OECD countries when the investment good is sufficiently capital intensive or drastically improved, delivering indeterminacy for a larger set of OECD countries, if the consumption good is sufficiently capital intensive. Focusing however on recent estimates of the sectoral capital shares corresponding to the empirically plausible case of a capital intensive consumption good, we find that there is a significant increase of the range of economically relevant labor tax rates (from a minimum tax rate of 30% to 24.7%) for which local indeterminacy arises with respect to the aggregate formulation of SGU.

Principes d’économie politique, forthcoming, 250 pages, Forthcoming

édition critique, traduction et présentation

A Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handoverRaouf Boucekkine, Paolo G. Piacquadio et Fabien Prieur, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Forthcoming

We consider an autocracy where the ruling elite control both the resource wealth and education policies. Education prompts economic growth and enriches the budget of the elite. However, education also increases the “awareness of citizens” – capturing their reluctance to accept a dictatorship and their labor market aspirations – and forces the elite to expand redistribution or handover the power. A power handover leads to a more democratic regime, where the elite retains (at least partially) its economic power. This trade-off is the backbone of our Lipsetian theory of voluntary power handover. This theory provides new insights on the positive relationship between economic development, education, and democratization, and on the negative relationship between inequality and democratization. Finally, we revisit the resources-curse hypothesis within our setting.

Austriaca, n° spécial « L’école autrichienne d’économie », J. Lajarrige (Eds.), forthcoming, Volume 89, Presses Universitaires de Rouens et du Havre (PURH), Forthcoming
Introduction : à la (re)découverte de l’école autrichienne d’économie (nationale)Gilles Campagnolo, Austriaca, Gilles Campagnolo (Eds.), Volume 89, Issue n° spécial « L’école autrichienne d’économie », Forthcoming
L’école autrichienne en Ukraine. La théorie de l’utilité marginale d’E. Slutsky (à partir d’archives inédites)Gilles Campagnolo et Valentyna Feshchenko, Austriaca, Gilles Campagnolo (Eds.), Volume 89, Issue n° spécial « L’école autrichienne d’économie », Forthcoming
Labor market shocks and youths’ time allocation in Egypt: Where does women’s empowerment come in?Marion Dovis, Patricia Augier et Clémentine Sadania, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Forthcoming
A proximal point method for difference of convex functions in multi-objective optimization with application to group dynamic problemsGlaydston de Carvalh Bento, Sandro Dimy Barbo Bitar, João Xavier da Neto, Antoine Soubeyran et João Carlos O. Souza, Computational Optimization and Applications, Forthcoming

We consider the constrained multi-objective optimization problem of finding Pareto critical points of difference of convex functions. The new approach proposed by Bento et al. (SIAM J Optim 28:1104–1120, 2018) to study the convergence of the proximal point method is applied. Our method minimizes at each iteration a convex approximation instead of the (non-convex) objective function constrained to a possibly non-convex set which assures the vector improving process. The motivation comes from the famous Group Dynamic problem in Behavioral Sciences where, at each step, a group of (possible badly informed) agents tries to increase his joint payoff, in order to be able to increase the payoff of each of them. In this way, at each step, this ascent process guarantees the stability of the group. Some encouraging preliminary numerical results are reported.

Fertile Ground for ConflictNicolas Berman, Mathieu Couttenier et Raphaël Soubeyran, Journal of the European Economic Association, Forthcoming

We investigate how variations in soil productivity affect civil conflicts. We first present a model with heterogeneous land in which variations in input prices (fertilizers) affect appropriable rents and the opportunity costs of fighting. The theory predicts that spikes in input prices increase the likelihood of conicts through their effect on income and inequality, and that this effect is magni fied when soil fertility is naturally more heterogenous. We test these predictions using data on conict events covering all Sub-Saharan African countries at a spatial resolution of 0.5 x 0.5 degree latitude and longitude over the 1997-2013 period. We combine information on soil characteristics and worldwide variations in fertilizer prices to identify local exogenous changes in input costs. As predicted, variations in soil productivity triggered by variations in fertilizer prices are positively associated with conicts, especially in cells where land endowments are more heterogeneous. In addition, we find that the distribution of land fertility both within and across ethnic groups affects violence, and that the effect of between-group heterogeneity in soil quality is magnified in densely populated areas. Overall, our findings imply that inequality in access to fertile areas { an issue largely neglected in the literature dealing with the roots of Sub-Saharan African civil wars { constitutes a serious threat to peace at the local-level.

Information Provision in Environmental Policy DesignVera Danilina et Alexander Grigoriev, Journal of environmental informatics, Forthcoming

Information provision is a relatively recent but steadily growing environmental policy tool. Its emergency and topicality are due to the current escalation of ecological threats. Meanwhile, its high complexity and flexibility require a comprehensive approach to its design, which has to be tailored for specific characteristics of production process, market structure, and regulatory goals. This work proposes such an approach and builds a framework based on a three-level mathematical program extending well-known two-level Stackelberg game by introducing one more economic agent and one extra level of this sequential game. This study provides simple and very intuitive algorithms to compute optimal multi-tier information provision policies, both mandatory and voluntary. The paper urges for the wide implementation of such efficient environmental policy design tools.