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Federica Romei

University of Oxford
Monopsony, Income Risk and R* Multiplicity
Co-écrit avec Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, Sergio de Ferra, Andrea Ferrero, Alexandre Kohlhas, Michael McMahon, Giovanni Rosso
Lieu
MEGA - Salle Carine Nourry

424, Chemin du Viaduc
13080 Aix-en-Provence

Date(s)
Jeudi 12 mars 2026
14:30 à 15:30
Contact(s)

Marco Fongoni : marco.fongoni[at]univ-amu.fr
Alexandros Loukas : alexandros.loukas[at]univ-amu.fr

Résumé

We develop a model where labor market monopsony and income risk generate multiple equilibria for the equilibrium real interest rate, R∗. Firms’ debt issuance amplifies labor income risk, making household asset demand non-monotonic. One equilibrium features higher R∗ and lower risk; another, lower R∗, higher debt, and higher risk. Policy affects equilibrium selection: central bank asset purchases lower R∗, while government debt raises it. Empirical evidence supports our prediction that asset supply changes have differing effects on interest rates before and after the Global Financial Crisis.