Decreuse

Publications

Residential Mobility and Unemployment of African Immigrants in France: A Calibration ApproachJournal articleBruno Decreuse and Benoît Schmutz, Annals of Economics and Statistics, Issue 107-108, pp. 51-91, 2012

We build and calibrate a model of simultaneous transitions on the housing and the labor market in order to account for the residual unemployment gap between African immigrants and non-immigrants in France. Our framework allows us to distinguish between the impact of ethnic-specific geographic preferences and ethnic-specific barriers to these two markets. The labor market accounts for about 85% of the residual unemployment gap, whereas the housing market accounts for about 75% of the ethnic differences in geographic location. Geographic preferences do not substantially impact the unemployment gap and account for about 25% of differences in residential location.

L'urgence du dialogue social: Compte-rendu des Entretiens de l'Association Française de Science EconomiqueJournal articleGilbert Cette, Bruno Decreuse and et al, Revue d'économie politique, Volume 122, Issue 3, pp. 321, 2012
Housing market regulation and the social demand for job protectionJournal articleBruno Decreuse and Tanguy van Ypersele, Journal of Public Economics, Volume 95, Issue 11, pp. 1397-1409, 2011

Controlling for country fixed effects, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between the degree of housing market regulation (HMR) and the strictness of employment protection legislation (EPL) in OECD countries. We provide a model in which HMR increases foreclosure costs in case of mortgage default, while EPL raises the administrative cost of dismissal. Owing to banks' lending behavior, individuals' demand for job protection increases with the cost of foreclosure. We use the model to discuss social housing and family insurance, the case for mortgage unemployment insurance, the impact of min down-payment policies, regulations on the use of fixed-term contracts, the failure of a 2006 French reform of labor contracts, and feed-back effects from HMR to EPL.

Search Intensity, Directed Search, And The Wage DistributionJournal articleBruno Decreuse and André Zylberberg, Journal of the European Economic Association, Volume 9, Issue 6, pp. 1168-1186, 2011

We propose a search equilibrium model in which homogenous rms post wages along with a vacancy to attract job-seekers, while homogenous unemployed workers invest in costly job-seeking. The key innovation relies on the organization of the search market and the search behavior of the job-seekers. The search market is continuously segmented by wage level, individuals can spread their search investment over the di¤erent sub-markets, and search intensity has marginal decreasing returns on each sub-market. We show that there exists a non-degenerate equilibrium wage distribution. The density of this wage distribution is increasing at low wages, and decreasing at high wages. Under additional restrictions, it is hump-shaped, and it can be right-tailed. Our results are illustrated by an example originating a Beta wage distribution.

Search externalities with crowding-out effectsJournal articleBruno Decreuse, Economics Bulletin, Volume 30, Issue 4, pp. 2751-2758, 2010

We consider a static search model with two types of workers, Nash bargaining, and free entry of firms. The matching function is specified so as cross-type congestion effects are asymmetric. Skilled workers create congestion effects for all, while unskilled workers do not affect the odds of employment for the skilled. An increase in the share of skilled workers has two effects on the welfare of the unskilled: a negative crowding-out effect, and a positive labor demand effect. The former (latter) effect dominates whenever the skill differential is small (large).

Compétences générales et compétences spécialisées. Le rôle des frictions du marché du travail revisitéJournal articleBruno Decreuse and Pierre Granier, Revue Économique, Issue 3, pp. 567-576, 2010

We set a model of skill acquisition where individuals choose the scope and intensity of their skills. More general skills allow the worker to perform on more jobs, but with a lower productivity. When the investment takes place before the labor market entry, frictions motivate the acquisition of more general skills. When the investment takes place once on the job, frictions have an ambiguous impact on the degree of skill generality. Classification JEL : I21 ; J24

Over-education for the rich, under-education for the poor: A search-theoretic microfoundationJournal articleOlivier Charlot and Bruno Decreuse, Labour Economics, Volume 17, Issue 6, pp. 886-896, 2010

This paper studies the efficiency of educational choices in a two sector/two schooling level matching model of the labor market where a continuum of heterogenous workers allocates itself between sectors depending on their decision to invest in education. Individuals differ in working ability and schooling cost, the search market is segmented by education, and there is free entry of new firms in each sector. Self-selection in education causes composition effects in the distribution of skills across sectors. This in turn modifies the intensity of job creation, implying the private and social returns to schooling always differ. Provided that ability and schooling cost are not too positively correlated, agents with large schooling costs – the 'poor' – underinvest in education, while there is overinvestment among the low schooling cost individuals – the 'rich'. We also show that education should be more taxed than subsidized when the Hosios condition holds.

La couverture du risque chômage au regard de la situation familialeJournal articleOlivier Charlot and Bruno Decreuse, Revue d'économie politique, Volume 120, Issue 6, pp. 895-928, 2010

This article surveys the literature studying the links between unemployment and the family. First, we focus on the interactions between family status and unemployment risks. Being in a couple rather than single, as the number of children influence unemployment duration. In turn, unemployment impacts couple formation and dissolution, as the decision to have children and the timing of births. We then investigate the mutual insurance role against labour income risks played by the spouses. We insist on the limited insurance provided by the spouses due to limited commitment, and the particularly high default risk in bad times for the couple. The latter risk is all the more important than unemployment alters bargaining powers inside the couple. Finally, this leads us to investigate the institutional framework aimed at protecting individuals/ families against labour market hazards (Unemployment Insurance and Employment Protection Legislation) and its interactions with the family. It turns out that many countries provide more Employment Protection to those having a family. However, Unemployment Insurance depends very little on family status, once taxes and transfers are taken into account.

Géographie du chômage des personnes d'origine africaine : PrésentationJournal articleLaurence Bouvard, Pierre-Philippe Combes, Bruno Decreuse, Morgane Laouénan, Benoît Schmutz and Alain Trannoy, Revue Française d'Économie, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp. 3-7, 2009

No abstract is available for this item.

Géographie du chômage des personnes d'origine africaine : 2) Pourquoi une si faible mobilité résidentielle ?Journal articleLaurence Bouvard, Pierre-Philippe Combes, Bruno Decreuse, Morgane Laouénan, Benoît Schmutz and Alain Trannoy, Revue Française d'Économie, Volume 23, Issue 3, pp. 57-107, 2009

Géographie du chômage des personnes d'origine africaine : 2) Pourquoi une si faible mobilité résidentielle ? Nous montrons à l'aide de l'enquête nationale Logement de l'Insee que les personnes d'origine africaine tendent à se fixer dans les grandes agglomérations dans des proportions beaucoup plus importantes que les personnes d'origine française. Deux raisons expliquent ce phénomène : la concentration du logement social dans les grandes villes et des phénomènes de discrimination à l'œuvre sur le marché du logement que nous mettons en évidence, tant sur le marché de la location que sur le marché de l'accession. Ces deux raisons permettent également d'expliquer, en dehors de toute préférence particulière, une sorte de tropisme des Africains vers le logement social : ils sont plus enclins à y entrer et beaucoup moins enclins à en sortir. Ces constats apparaissent robustes au contrôle des caractéristiques individuelles. ché de l'accession. Ces deux raisons permettent également d'expliquer, en dehors de toute préférence particulière, une sorte de tropisme des Africains vers le logement social : ils sont plus enclins à y entrer et beaucoup moins enclins à en sortir. Ces constats apparaissent robustes au contrôle des caractéristiques individuelles.