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Abstract We challenge the accepted wisdom of a global secular decline in the labor share. We document three issues: (i) starting periods for the empirical analysis; (ii) accounting for self-employment; and (iii) accounting for residential real estate income. An empirical analysis is carried out on the Euro Area (EA) and ten developed countries. When the three issues are set aside, the orientation of the labor share in the business sector appears not to be a general downward or upward one.
Keywords Value added sharing, Labor cost, Labor share
Abstract Ce travail propose de configurer l’idéologie sous jacente aux théories partenariales à travers les différentes écoles de pensée éthique. Focalisées sur la notion de bien commun ou d’intérêt général, les théories partenariales semblent avoir une grammaire commune qui, au delà des différences entre écoles de pensée, conduit à définir un mécanisme de prise de décision éthique fondé sur la notion d’empathie rationnelle d’Adam Smith. Nous suggérons que les tenants de cette approche partenariale devraient promouvoir une politique éducative favorable à des prises de décisions justes. Cette politique éducative repose sur des enseignements spécifiques dans lesquels la littérature et le cinéma devraient permettre de sensibiliser les dirigeants à la complexité de ce type de décision.
Abstract This paper shows that the platforms' private information on demand may explain the empirical observation that platforms like Amazon resell high-demand products, while acting as marketplace for low-demand goods. More precisely, the paper examines the strategic interaction between a seller and a better informed platform within a signalling game. We consider that the platform may choose between two distinct business models: act as a reseller or work as a pure marketplace between the buyers and the seller. The marketplace mode, which allows to internalize the spillover between the platform's sales and the seller's direct sales is always preferred for a low-value good. The reselling mode, which allows the platform to take advantage of its private information, may be selected in the case of high-value goods provided that (i) the externalities between direct sales and platform sales are not too strong and (ii) the difference between consumers' willingness to pay for the high and the low-value goods is large enough. Under these conditions, the game displays a Least-Cost Separating Equilibrium in which the platform works as a marketplace for low-demand goods, while it acts as a reseller in the case of high-demand goods.
Keywords Demand uncertainty, Platform, Asymmetric information, Reselling, Marketplace
Abstract This paper presents an asymptotically optimal time interval selection criterion for the long-run correlation block estimator (Bartlett kernel estimator) based on the Newey–West and Andrews–Monahan approaches. An alignment criterion that enhances finite-sample performance is also proposed. The procedure offers an optimal alternative to the customary practice in finance and economics of heuristically or arbitrarily choosing time intervals or lags in correlation studies. A Monte Carlo experiment using parameters derived from Dow Jones returns data confirms that the procedure can be MSE-superior to alternatives such as aggregation over arbitrary time intervals, parametric VAR, and Newey–West covariance matrix estimation with automatic lag selection.
Keywords Long-run correlation, Andrews–Monahan, Newey–West, Alignment, Lag selection, Bartlett
Abstract We present a model showing the evolution of an organization of agents who discuss democratically about good practices. This model feeds on a field work we did for about twelve years in France where we followed NPOs, called AMAPs, and observed their construction through time at the regional and national level. Most of the hypothesis we make here are either based on the literature on opinion diffusion or on the results of our field work. By defining dynamics where agents influence each other, make collective decision at the group level, and decide to stay in or leave their respective groups, we analyse the effect of different forms of vertical communication that is meant to spread good practices within the organization. Our main indicators of the good functioning of the democratic dynamics are stability and representativeness. We show that if communication about norms is well designed, it has a positive impact on both stability and representativeness. Interestingly the effect of communication increases with the number of dimensions discussed in the groups. Communication about norms is thus a valuable tool to use in groups that wish to improve their democratic practices without jeopardizing stability.
Keywords Short Food Chain, Communication, Non-Profit Organization, Democracy, Opinion Dynamics, Agent-Based Model
Abstract This article examines the effects of socioeconomic position and urban–rural settlement on the distribution of out-of-pocket expenditure (OPE) for health in the Russian Federation. Data comes from 2005 to 2016 waves of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. Concentration index reflects changes in the distribution of OPE between the worse-off and the better-off Russians over a 12-year period. Finally, unconditional quantile regression—a recentred influence function approach estimates differential impacts of covariates along the distribution of OPE. OPE is concentrated amongst the better-off Russians in 2016. Urban settlements contribute to top end OPE distribution for the richest and town settlements, at the median for the richest and the poorest. Our model for the analysis is unique in the context of study population, as it marginalises the effect over the distributions of other covariates used in the model.
Keywords Socioeconomic, TQuantile, Out-of-pocke, Fairness, Expenditure, Distribution
Abstract Purpose Using a representative survey of young persons having left full-time education in France in 1998 and interviewed in 2001 and 2005, the purpose of this paper is to examine the process of their integration into normal employment (a stable job with a standard employment contract) and the extent to which job matches are inefficient in the sense that the pay in a job is below an individual's potential earnings. The latter are determined principally by diploma level and educational specialisation, although other forms of training and labour market experience are relevant. Design/methodology/approach A stochastic earnings frontier approach is used in order to examine workers' ability to capture their full potential earnings in labour markets where there is inefficient job matching (due to the lack of information, discrimination, over-education or the process of integration). Findings The results suggest that young workers manage to obtain on average about 82 per cent of their potential earnings three years after leaving full-time education and earnings inefficiency had disappeared four years later. The results are robust to the treatment of selectivity arising from the exclusion of the unemployed in the estimation of the frontier. Originality/value The stochastic earnings frontier is a useful and appropriate tool for modelling the process of labour market integration of certain groups (young persons, migrants and the long-term unemployed) where over-education due to inefficient initial job matches occurs. Over time this situation tends to be rectified as job mobility leads to improved matching and less inefficiency.
Keywords Youth, Stochastic frontier, Pay, Labour market, Integration, Qualifications
Abstract This paper explores the main differences between the Shapley values of a set of taxa introduced by Haake et al. (J Math Biol 56:479–497, 2007. https://doi-org.lama.univ-amu.fr/10.1007/s00285-007-0126-2) and Fuchs and Jin (J Math Biol 71:1133–1147, 2015. https://doi-org.lama.univ-amu.fr/10.1007/s00285-014-0853-0), the latter having been found identical to the Fair Proportion index (Redding and Mooers in Conserv Biol 20:1670–1678, 2006. https://doi-org.lama.univ-amu.fr/10.1111/j.1523-1739.2006.00555.x). In line with Shapley (in: Kuhn, Tucker (eds) Contributions to to the theory of games, volume II, annals of mathematics studies 28, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1953), we identify the cooperative game basis for each of these two classes of phylogenetic games and use them (i) to construct simple formulas for these two Shapley values and (ii) to compare these different approaches. Using the set of weights of a phylogenetic tree as a parameter space, we then discuss the conditions under which these two values coincide and, if they are not the same, revisit Hartmann’s (J Math Biol 67:1163–1170, 2013. https://doi-org.lama.univ-amu.fr/10.1007/s00285-012-0585-y) convergence result. An example illustrates our main argument. Finally, we compare the species ranking induced by these two values. Considering the Kendall and the Spearman rank correlation coefficient, simulations show that these rankings are strongly correlated. These results are consistent with Wicke and Fischer (J Theor Biol 430:207–214, 2017. https://doi-org.lama.univ-amu.fr/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.07.010), who reach similar conclusions with a different simulation method.
Keywords Shapley value, Phylogenetic trees, Biodiversity, Fair Proportion index
Abstract Lorsqu’en 1871 Carl Menger (1840-1921) publie ses Principes d’économie politique– en quête d’une voie alternative au libre-échangisme britannique et au socialisme historique allemand –, il offre l’un des grands livres pivots dans l’histoire de la pensée, à la hauteur de La Richesse des nations (Smith), de la Théorie générale (Keynes) ou du Capital (Marx). En effet, aux côtés de Walras et de Jevons (mais bien différemment d’eux), il inaugure une économie théorique pure et engage la « révolution marginaliste » qui constitue le moment fondateur du courant dominant (et contesté) de la science économique contemporaine. Menger pose en même temps la pierre fondatrice de l’« école autrichienne » (Böhm-Bawerk, Schumpeter, Mises, Hayek) dont la méthodologie et la philosophie individualistes imprègnent et font débat dans l’ensemble des sciences humaines et sociales. Or cette œuvre majeure n’était accessible ni en français ni avec les fort nombreux ajouts manuscrits que Menger apporta, jusqu’en 1910, en vue d’une nouvelle édition amplement augmentée. Vingt années durant, Gilles Campagnolo a collecté et traduit ces manuscrits dispersés à l’étranger après la mort de Menger. Son édition critique, unique au monde, est la première à restituer cette œuvre classique au plus près du nouveau texte voulu par son auteur. Le texte de Menger est précédé d’un historique des éditions et suivi d’un appareil critique complet. Dans la présentation éclairante qui ouvre ce volume, G. Campagnolo donne les clés pour comprendre l’œuvre de Menger et la resituer dans son contexte historique et intellectuel.
Abstract We study optimal contracts in a regulator-agent setting with joint production, altruistic and selfish agents, and uneasy outcome measurement. Such a setting represents sectors of activities such as education and health care provision. The agents and the regulator jointly produce an outcome for which they all care to some extent that is varying from agent to agent. Some agents, the altruistic ones, care more than the regulator does while others, the selfish agents, care less. Moral hazard is present due to the agent's effort that is not contractible. Adverse selection is present too since the regulator cannot a priori distinguish between altruistic and selfish agents. Contracts consist of a simple transfer from the regulator to the agents together with the regulator's input in the joint production. We show that a screening contract is not optimal when we face both moral hazard and adverse selection.
Keywords Altruism, Adverse selection, Moral hazard, Regulator-agent joint production