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Abstract [Eng] Housing is a crucial good for households, both as a consumer good via the flow of services it fosters, and as an essential component of a homeowner’s wealth. It is also crucial because it accounts for more than a quarter of household’s expenses, and an increase in rent or property prices instantly has a major impact on their living standards, choice of location, mobility, and savings options. Finally, housing is also crucial because it is unique as an element of space‑time, space and time that cannot be separated in this instance. These themes are examined in this special issue, with a variety of approaches and different perspectives, providing valuable information on a number of outstanding issues.
Abstract In this paper, we study the production and dissemination of public knowledge goods, such as technological knowledge, generated by a network of voluntarily cooperating innovators. We develop a private-collective model of public knowledge production in networked innovation systems, where group-based social preferences have an impact on the coalition formation of developers. Our model builds on the large empirical literature on voluntary production of pooled public knowledge goods, including source code in communities of software developers or data provided to open access data repositories. Our analysis shows under which conditions social preferences, such as ‘group belonging’ or ‘peer approval’, influence the stable coalition size, as such rationalising several stylized facts emerging from large-scale surveys of open-source software developers, previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, heterogeneity of social preferences is added to the model to study the formation of stable but mixed coalitions.
Keywords Coalition formation, Networked innovation, Open-source software OSS, Public knowledge goods, Private-collective model, Social preferences
Abstract Cet article traite des formes de solidarité sociale nouvelles qui émergent aujourd’hui dans le double contexte d’accentuation des inégalités socio-spatiales et d’altération du système français de solidarité nationale. Nous analysons les conditions qui font que ce système devient de plus en plus inopérant face à des situations d’inégalité d’une diversité croissante, à la fois multiscalaires, multifactorielles et cumulatives. En nous appuyant sur une approche théorique en termes de proximité, et en nous référant aux situations largement évoquées aujourd’hui dans la littérature, nous mettons en évidence les conditions qui favorisent désormais l’apparition de « communs sociaux ». Nous montrons en quoi ces communs se distinguent des modalités anciennes de solidarité communautaire. Nous soulignons enfin à quelles conditions ces communs sont susceptibles de constituer des réponses justes et durables à l’accentuation actuelle des inégalités sociales.
Keywords Communs sociaux, Communs territoriaux, Proximité, Solidarité, Inégalités, France
Abstract This paper estimates the effects of an increase in the share of the real estate transfer taxes (RETT) rates going to the French départements from 3.80% to 4.50%. Not all the départe-ments voted the RETT increase on the same date, which is the starting point of a natural experiment. Using a difference-indifferences design, we estimate two main effects. (1) An anticipation effect, one month before the implementation of the reform, in order to avoid the RETT increase. (2) A retention effect in the post-reform period. In the end, the net effect (retention minus anticipation) corresponds to an average drop in transactions of around 6% over the first three months after the reform, that is, approximately 15,000 transactions lost at national level. If we find a short term effect of the reform, we do not find evidence of a medium-or long-term effect.
Keywords Natural experiment, Transfer taxes, Real estate market, Local government, Natural experiment
Abstract We consider a general equilibrium model with vertical preferences, where workers and consumers are differentiated, respectively, by their sensitivity to effort and their intensity of preference for quality. We consider a monopoly of which the shares are owned by a fraction of the general population. The price is determined through a vote among all the shareholders. We identify necessary and sufficient conditions for (i) an absolute (relative) majority to vote for the profit maximizing price; (ii) an absolute (relative) majority to vote for a different price. We argue that the more concentrated the ownership the more likely it is that the firm charges the profit-maximizing price.
Keywords General equilibrium, Profit maximization, Vertical preferences, Majority vote
Abstract A sizable literature has established the positive impact of social infrastructure on economic development, but the determinants of social infrastructure itself have yet to be fully explored. Competing theories suggest a variety of political institutions as driving forces of social infrastructure, but the empirical literature has been hampered by the small set of available proxies, many of which are broadly defined. We leverage a new, comprehensive dataset that codes political institutions directly from countries’ constitutions. By employing a statistical methodology that is designed to juxtapose candidate regressors associated with many competing theories, we test each individual political institution's effect on social infrastructure. Our results show that constitutional rules pertaining to executive constraints as well as to the structure of electoral systems are crucial for the development of high-quality social infrastructure. We also find that the determinants of social infrastructure are much more fundamental than previously thought: not only the general structure of electoral systems matter, but also highly detailed aspects such as limits on campaign contributions and the freedom to form parties. Moreover, the granularity of our data allows us to highlight the profound effect of basic human rights on social infrastructure, a dimension which has not been explored in the literature to date.
Keywords Bayesian Model Averaging, Social Infrastructure, Institutions, Constitutions
Abstract We focus on the design of an institutional device aimed to foster coordination through communication. We explore whether the social psychology theory of commitment, implemented via a truth-telling oath, can reduce coordination failure. Using a classic coordination game, we ask all players to sign voluntarily a truth-telling oath before playing the game with cheap talk communication. Three results emerge with commitment under oath: (1) coordination increased by nearly 50 percent; (2) senders' messages were significantly more truthful and actions more efficient, and (3) receivers' trust of messages increased.
Keywords Oath, Cheap talk communication, Coordination game
Abstract This paper studies the transfer problem in a model featuring comparative advantage, mo-nopolistic competition, trade costs, and firm heterogeneity in factor intensity. The results are very different from those of the previous literature. First, a transfer creates a secondary burden in situations where the neoclassical version of the Heckscher-Ohlin model would not. Second, a transfer affects wage inequality. Third, a transfer is not neutral to world welfare. Fourth, floating exchange rates do not substitute for deflation. Fifth, a simulation exercise shows that the quantitative effects of trade imbalances are comparable in magnitude to those arising from major trade agreements.
Abstract Depuis au moins deux décennies, les économies des pays industrialisés connaissent une décélération tendancielle de l’inflation ainsi qu’un écrasement des cycles de l’inflation. Ces phénomènes sont le résultat de plusieurs facteurs d’ordre structurel.Le premier est l’atténuation des déterminants nationaux de l’inflation. Elle se traduit par une moindre réactivité de l’inflation aux tensions du marché...
Abstract Plus de 4 500 définitions relevant de tous les domaines de l'économie et des disciplines associées.Le Lexique d'économie est conçu pour être un outil de formation, d'apprentissage et de révision des notions fondamentales en sciences économiques et de gestion, tout en s'ouvrant aux autres sciences sociales connexes, conformément aux programmes des classes préparatoires et des premiers cycles universitaires. • La présentation des différents courants, théories, écoles et doctrines économiques. • Des définitions les plus simples aux concepts les plus techniques, expliqués de manière claire et synthétique. • Un système d'encadrés mettant en avant les 100 notions fondamentales de la matière. • Des corrélats et des renvois qui font le lien entre les définitions associées.
Abstract The elicitation format is a crucial aspect of Contingent Valuation (CV) surveys and can impact their reliability. This paper contributes to the extensive debate on WTP (Willingness To Pay) elicitation formats by assessing whether the Circular Payment Card (CPC) can reduce anchoring on respondents' previous answers under multiple elicitation questions. This new format uses a visual pie-chart representation without start or end points: respondents spin the circular card in any direction until they find the section that best matches their WTP. We used a CV survey based on two ways of reducing risks associated with flooding, each randomly presented first to half of the respondents, to test the absolute performance of CPC. We presented a second survey on two social insurance schemes for subjects currently uninsured to respondents randomly split into three subgroups. Each group's WTP was elicited using one of three formats: Open-Ended (OE), standard Payment Card (PC) and the new CPC. The two insurance schemes were always proposed in the same order, and we assessed the relative performance of CPC by comparing anchoring across respondents. Our results provide evidence that CPC is likely to reduce anchoring in multiple elicitation questions and that respondents may rely on different heuristic decisions when giving WTP in the OE and in the two PC formats.
Keywords Flood, Social insurance, Circular payment card, Payment card, Elicitation format, Willingness to pay
Abstract Human prosociality toward nonkin is ubiquitous and almost unique in the animal kingdom. It remains poorly understood, although a proliferation of theories has arisen to explain it. We present evidence from survey data and laboratory treatment of experimental subjects that is consistent with a set of theories based on group-level selection of cultural norms favoring prosociality. In particular, increases in competition increase trust levels of individuals who (i) work in firms facing more competition, (ii) live in states where competition increases, (iii) move to more competitive industries, and (iv) are placed into groups facing higher competition in a laboratory experiment. The findings provide support for cultural group selection as a contributor to human prosociality. As predicted by cultural group selection, increases in firm-level competition raise the generalized trust of workers.
Abstract This paper proposes some simple models where the central bank trades off between stabilizing the business cycle and targeting inflation to a level that stabilizes the public debt ratio. We show that in a closed economy fiscal dominance does not necessarily imply hyperinflation. Moreover, in an open economy it is successful in lowering debt ratios when output is reactive enough to unconventional monetary policy and when the expectations of future inflation are well anchored to the debt-stabilization inflation target. We show that the dynamics of both inflation and public debt ratio are described by first-difference equations with time varying coefficients. We provide some conditions for the asymptotic solutions of the long-run steady states. In particular, we define two regimes of respectively strong and weak fiscal dominance, depending upon whether or not the central bank's action ensures both the sustainability and the speed of convergence of debt to its long-term level.
Keywords Debt sustainability, Unconventional monetary policy, Fiscal dominance
Abstract Coastal lagoons ecosystems, while representing benefits for the local populations, have been subjected to high anthropogenic pressures for decades. Hence, conservation measures of these ecosystems are urgently needed and should be combined with their sustainable uses. To address these issues, new research avenues for decision support systems have emphasized the role of the assessment of ecosystem services for establishing conservation priorities by avoiding monetarization approaches. These approaches, because they flatten the various values of nature by projecting them on the single monetary dimension, are often rejected by the stakeholders. We undertake a Q analysis to identify levels of consensus and divergence among stakeholders on the prioritization of ecosystem services provided by two French Mediterranean coastal lagoons areas. The results highlighted that there is a strong consensus among categories of stakeholders in the study sites about the paramount importance of regulation and maintenance services. Three groups of stakeholders, each sharing the same points of view regarding ecosystem services conservation, were identified for each study site. As a non-monetary valuation, Q methodology is very instrumental for the new pluralistic approach of decision support by capturing the values expressed by the stakeholders, without triggering a rejection reflex due to the monetarization.
Keywords Q methodology, Decision Making, Value Plurality, Non-monetary valuation, Ecosystem services, Coastal lagoons
Abstract We propose some new stylized facts on Vietnamese exporters that emphasize firm heterogeneity in trade regimes and firm ownership. We show first that the distribution of firms' export intensities is U-shaped with more than half of Vietnamese exporters exporting more than 50% of their output. This contrasts with the export patterns in industrialized countries but is similar to the export intensity distribution for other emerging economies with strong participation in global value chains. Second, we show that export premia, evaluated in terms of both productivity and wage indexes, are positive only for Vietnamese exporters involved primarily in ordinary trade, and that processing exporters exhibit lower productivity indexes and pay lower wages than their non-exporting counterparts. This pattern is more pronounced among the group of foreign-owned firms in Vietnam compared to the group of domestic firms and is in line with previous findings for China.
Keywords HCC
Abstract We consider a one-dimensional model of electoral competition with national and regional parties. There are two regions and three parties—one national party and one regional party for each region. We divide the paper into two parts—homogeneous and heterogeneous regions. In the former, the policy positions of the national party and the regional party of the region with the greater number of constituencies coincide with the favorite policy position of the region-wide median voter. In the latter, the national party chooses a policy position in a maximal isolation set, while the two regional parties choose policies on the same side of the national party’s policy as their own respective region-wide medians. For a given outcome function, the national party performs better when the regions are heterogeneous. In the homogeneous regions case, the national party can at best do as well as the regional party of the region with the greater number of constituencies. Our results are broadly consistent with intuition and evidence.