Lucas Pahl

Séminaires thématiques
Economic theory seminar

Lucas Pahl

University of Bonn
Robust Equilibria in Generic Extensive-form Games
Lieu

IBD Salle 15

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 15

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Vendredi 22 décembre 2023| 12:00 - 13:00
Contact(s)

Gaëtan Fournier : gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.fr

Résumé

We prove the 2-player, generic extensive-form case of the conjecture of Govindan and Wilson (1997a,b) and Hauk and Hurkens (2002) stating that an equilibrium component is essential in every equivalent game if and only if the index of the component is nonzero. This provides an index-theoretic characterization of the concept of hyperstable components of equilibria in generic extensive-form games, first formulated by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986).