Hanoteau

Publications

Lobbying pour les permis négociables et non-neutralité du mode d'allocationJournal articleJulien Hanoteau, Revue Économique, Volume 55, Issue 3, pp. 517-525, 2004

In an agency model of politics, we show that the choice of an allocation method for tradable emissions permits is not neutral. The decision of a "corrupted" government to auction the permits or to grant them for free affects their equilibrium quantity and price as it modifies the incentive of capital owners of a polluting industry to lobby for or against emissions abatement. Classification JEL : D78, H23, Q28

Lobbying for Emissions Allowances: A New Perspective on the Political Economy of the US Acid Rain Program. (en)Book chapterJulien Hanoteau, In: The role of organized interest groups in policy making, Di Gioacchino al. (Eds.), 2004, pp. 289-311, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004

This paper shows empirically that the choice between auction and grandfathering for the distribution of pollution permits is not neutral in presence of political market failures as it motivates rent-seeking. We model the distribution of free permits in the US sulfur emissions trading system as an endogenous sharing rule and we test this relation using PAC contribution as a measure of political influence. We find that shareholder interests of the US power sector influenced the distribution of permits as they were motivated by a windfall gain despite profit regulation in their sector and thanks to a climate of regulatory uncertainty when the law was discussed

Lobbying for Emissions Allowances: A New Perspective on the Political Economy of the US Acid Rain Program.Journal articleJulien Hanoteau, Rivista di Politica Economica, Volume 93, Issue 1, pp. 289-314, 2003

This paper shows empirically that the choice between auction and grandfathering for the distribution of pollution permits is not neutral in presence of political market failures as it motivates rent-seeking. We model the distribution of free permits in the US sulfur emissions trading system as an endogenous sharing rule and we test this relation using PAC contribution as a measure of political influence. We find that shareholder interests of the US power sector influenced the distribution of permits as they were motivated by a windfall gain despite profit regulation in their sector and thanks to a climate of regulatory uncertainty when the law was discussed.