La plupart des informations présentées ci-dessous ont été récupérées via RePEc avec l'aimable autorisation de Christian Zimmermann
Information Provision in Environmental Policy DesignJournal articleVera Danilina et Alexander Grigoriev, Journal of environmental informatics, Forthcoming

Information provision is a relatively recent but steadily growing environmental policy tool. Its emergency and topicality are due to the current escalation of ecological threats. Meanwhile, its high complexity and flexibility require a comprehensive approach to its design, which has to be tailored for specific characteristics of production process, market structure, and regulatory goals. This work proposes such an approach and builds a framework based on a three-level mathematical program extending well-known two-level Stackelberg game by introducing one more economic agent and one extra level of this sequential game. This study provides simple and very intuitive algorithms to compute optimal multi-tier information provision policies, both mandatory and voluntary. The paper urges for the wide implementation of such efficient environmental policy design tools.

God insures those who pay? Formal insurance and religious offerings in Ghana.Journal articleEmmanuelle Auriol, Julie Lassébie, Amma Panin, Eva Raiber et Paul Seabright, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Forthcoming

This paper provides experimental support for the hypothesis that insurance can be a motive for religious donations. We randomize enrollment of members of a Pentecostal church in Ghana into a commercial funeral insurance policy. Then church members allocate money between themselves and a set of religious goods in a series of dictator games with significant stakes. Members enrolled in insurance give significantly less money to their own church compared to members that only receive information about the insurance. Enrollment also reduces giving towards other spiritual goods. We set up a model exploring different channels of religiously based insurance.
The implications of the model and the results from the dictator games suggest that adherents perceive the church as a source of insurance and that this insurance is derived from beliefs in an interventionist God. Survey results suggest that material insurance from the church community is also important and we hypothesize that these two insurance channels exist in parallel.

The Welfare Consequences of Centralization: Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment in SwitzerlandJournal articleSarah Flèche, Review of Economics and Statistics, Forthcoming

Many countries are reallocating tasks and powers to more central levels of government. To identify centralization’s welfare effects, I use a difference-in-differences design that relies on time and cross-cantonal variation in the implementation of centralization reforms in Switzerland. I find that centralization provokes significant decreases in residents’ life satisfaction. I identify one mechanism driving the effect, namely the procedural disutility that individuals experience from having less influence over the formulation of political decisions. This effect is largest among individuals with higher expected benefits from being involved in the political decision process, with detrimental effects on local political participation.

Contracting Under Unverifiable Monetary CostsJournal articleNicolas Quérou, Antoine Soubeyran et Raphaël Soubeyran, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Forthcoming

We consider a contracting relationship where the agent's effort induces monetary costs, and limits on the agent's resource restrict his capability to exert effort. We show that, the principal finds it best to offer a sharing contract while providing the agent with an up-front financial transfer only when the monetary cost is neither too low nor too high. Thus, unlike in the limited liability literature, the principal might find it optimal to fund the agent. Moreover, both incentives and the amount of funding are non-monotonic functions of the monetary cost. These results suggest that an increase in the interest rate may affect the form of contracts differently , depending on the initial level of the former. Using the analysis, we provide and discuss several predictions and policy implications.

An evolutionary finance model with short selling and endogenous asset supplyJournal articleRabah Amir, Sergei Belkov, Igor V. Evstigneev et Thorsten Hens, Economic Theory, Forthcoming

Evolutionary finance focuses on questions of “survival and extinction” of investment strategies (portfolio rules) in the market selection process. It analyzes stochastic dynamics of financial markets in which asset prices are determined endogenously by a short-run equilibrium between supply and demand. Equilibrium is formed in each time period in the course of interaction of portfolio rules of competing market participants. A comprehensive theory of evolutionary dynamics of this kind has been developed for models in which short selling is not allowed and asset supply is exogenous. The present paper extends the theory to a class of models with short selling and endogenous asset supply.

Altruism and Risk Sharing in NetworksJournal articleRenaud Bourlès, Yann Bramoullé et Eduardo Perez-Richet, Journal of the European Economic Association, Forthcoming

We provide the first analysis of the risk sharing implications of altruism networks. Agents are embedded in a fixed network and care about each other. We explore whether altruistic transfers help smooth consumption and how this depends on the shape of the network. We find that altruism networks have a first-order impact on risk. Altruistic transfers generate efficient insurance when the network of perfect altruistic ties is strongly connected. We uncover two specific empirical implications of altruism networks. First, bridges can generate good overall risk sharing and, more generally, the quality of informal insurance depends on the average path length of the network. Second, large shocks are well-insured by connected altruism networks. By contrast, large shocks tend to be badly insured in models of informal insurance with frictions. We characterize what happens for shocks that leave the structure of giving relationships unchanged. We further explore the relationship between consumption variance and centrality, correlation in consumption streams across agents and the impact of adding links.

Learning with minimal information in continuous gamesJournal articleSebastian Bervoets, Mario Bravo et Mathieu Faure, Theoretical Economics, Forthcoming

While payoff-based learning models are almost exclusively devised for finite action games, where players can test every action, it is harder to design such learning processes for continuous games. We construct a stochastic learning rule, designed for games with continuous action sets, which requires no sophistication from the players and is simple to implement: players update their actions according to variations in own payoff between current and previous action. We then analyze its behavior in several classes of continuous games and show that convergence to a stable Nash equilibrium is guaranteed in all games with strategic complements as well as in concave games, while convergence to Nash occurs in all locally ordinal potential games as soon as Nash equilibria are isolated.

Egalitarian redistribution in the era of hyper-globalizationJournal articleGianluca Grimalda, Alain Trannoy, Fernando Filgueira et Karl Ove Moene, Review of Social Economy, pp. 1-34, Forthcoming

Two traditional theorems of welfare economics posit a trade-off between a government redistribution targets and efficiency. We propose a third ‘claim’ of welfare economics, stating that in closed economies the actual efficiency costs associated with redistribution are small. We then examine the claim in the current phase of ‘hyper-globalization’. On the one hand, a race-to-the-bottom in taxation restricts the capacity to tax high-earners and the associated brain drain may affect a country’s long-run growth. On the other hand, demand for social insurance should be particularly high in an open economy, especially with advancing digitalization. Xenophobic sentiments may, however, offset this demand. We also discuss the impact of globalization on wage equalization and productive efficiency. We conclude against the idea that the welfare state is intrinsically unable to carry out its redistributive function in an era of globalization. However, its strategies and tools of intervention must be rethought.

The long-lasting effects of family and childhood on adult wellbeing: Evidence from British cohort dataJournal articleSarah Flèche, Warn N. Lekfuangfu et Andrew E. Clark, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Forthcoming

To what extent do childhood experiences continue to affect adult wellbeing over the life course? Previous work on this link has been carried out either at one particular adult age or for some average over adulthood. We here use two British birth-cohort datasets (the 1958 NCDS and the 1970 BCS) to map out the time profile of the effect of childhood experiences on adult outcomes, including life satisfaction. We find that the effects of many aspects of childhood do not fade away over time but are rather remarkably stable. In both birth-cohorts, child non-cognitive skills are the strongest predictors of adult life satisfaction at all ages. Of these, emotional health is the strongest. Childhood cognitive performance is more important than good conduct in explaining adult life satisfaction in the earlier NCDS cohort, whereas this ranking is inverted in the more recent BCS.

Convergence of GDP per capita in advanced countries over the twentieth centuryJournal articleAntonin Bergeaud, Gilbert Cette et Rémy Lecat, Empirical Economics, Forthcoming

This study compares GDP per capita levels and growth rates across 17 advanced economies over the period 1890–2013 using an accounting breakdown and runs Phillips and Sul (Econometrica 75(6):1771–1855, 2007) convergence tests. An overall convergence process has been at work among advanced economies, mainly after WWII, driven mostly by capital intensity and then TFP, while trends in hours worked and employment rates are disparate. However, this convergence process came to a halt during technology shocks, during the two world wars and since the 1990s, with the convergence of advanced economies stopping far from the level of US GDP per capita.