Andrew Mackenzie

Thematic seminars
Economic theory seminar

Andrew Mackenzie

Maastricht University
Tract housing, the core, and pendulum auctions
Joint with
Yu Zhou
Venue

IBD Salle 16

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Salle 16

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Thursday, April 13 2023| 12:00pm to 1:00pm
Contact(s)

Gaëtan Fournier: gaetan.fournier[at]univ-amu.fr

Abstract

We consider a model of tract housing where buyers and sellers have (i) wealth constraints, and (ii) unit demand over identical indivisible objects represented by a valuation. First, we characterize the strong core. Second, we characterize the bilateral weak core, or the weak core allocations with no side-payments. Finally, when buyer wealth constraints and valuations are private information and when transfers are discrete, we introduce two families of pendulum auctions, both of which consist of obviously strategy-proof implementations of the bilateral weak core. The buyer-optimal pendulum auctions are preferred by the buyers but are inefficient when side-payments are possible, while the efficient pendulum auctions are efficient.