Ariel Rubinstein
New-York University, Tel Aviv University
Directions in modeling bounded rationality (lecture mostly based on the paper "A model of persuasion with boundedly rational agents")
Venue
VC Cinéma le Miroir
Centre de la Vieille-Charité - Cinéma le Miroir
Centre de la Vieille Charité
2 rue de la Charité
13002 Marseille
Date(s)
Monday, December 5 2016| 2:30pm to 4:00pm
Contact(s)
Timothée Demont: timothee.demont[at]univ-amu.fr
Roberta Ziparo: rziparo[at]gmail.com
Abstract
A new model of persuasion is presented. A listener first announces and commits to a codex (i.e., a set of conditions). The speaker then presents a (not necessarily true) profile that must satisfy the codex in order for the listener to be persuaded. The speaker is boundedly rational in the sense that his ability to come up with a persuasive profile is limited and depends on the true profile and the content and framing of the codex. The circumstances under which the listener can design a codex that will implement his goal are fully characterized.
Download
More information