Etienne Lalé

Thematic seminars
Macro and labor market seminar

Etienne Lalé

York University
Disincentive Effects of Unemployment Insurance Benefits
Joint with
A. Hornstein, M. Karabarbounis, A. Kurmann, Lien Ta
Venue

MEGA Salle Carine Nourry

MEGA - Salle Carine Nourry

Maison de l'économie et de la gestion d'Aix
424 chemin du viaduc
13080 Aix-en-Provence

Date(s)
Thursday, September 25 2025| 2:30pm to 3:30pm
Contact(s)

Marco Fongoni: marco.fongoni[at]univ-amu.fr
Alexandros Loukas: alexandros.loukas[at]univ-amu.fr

Abstract

Unemployment insurance (UI) acts both as a disincentive for labor supply and as a demand stimulus, which may explain why empirical studies often find limited effects of UI on employment. This paper provides independent estimates of the disincentive effects arising from the largest expansion of UI in U.S. history, the pandemic unemployment benefits. Using high-frequency data on small restaurants and retailers from Homebase, we control for demand effects by comparing neighboring businesses that largely share the positive impact of UI stimulus. We find that employment in low-wage businesses recovered more slowly than employment in neighboring high-wage businesses in labor markets with larger dfferences in the relative generosity of pandemic UI benefits. According to a labor search model that replicates the estimated employment dfferences between low- and high-wage businesses, the disincentive effects from the pandemic UI programs held back the aggregate employment recovery by 3.4 percentage points between April and December 2020.