Kenza Elass*, Tizié Bene**

phd seminar

Kenza Elass*, Tizié Bene**

Gender differences in job search: How the reservation wage gap intensifies along the wage distribution*
Formal insurance and risk-sharing networks**
Tuesday, April 20 2021| 11:00am to 12:30pm

Anushka Chawla: anushka.chawla[at]
Kenza Elass: kenza.elass[at]
Carolina Ulloa Suarez: carolina.ulloa-suarez[at]


*A growing literature documents the gender-biased preferences impacting the job search behaviour and leading to different occupational distribution. Nevertheless, while there are many experimental studies about differences in psychological factors between men and women, there have been only a very limited number of studies confirming the relevance of these factors for labour market outcomes.  Using French administrative data, FH-DADS, providing information on job search behaviour and reemployment outcomes, this paper assesses the gender gap in job search preferences and especially the reservation wage.  Quantile decomposition methods allow me to document an unequal gap in reservation wage along the distribution and with education level. My results show that the gender gap in reservation wage is higher for the more educated unemployed and the unemployed at the top of the distribution.

**In many developing economies, formal insurance companies struggle to settle. People often mitigate risk by making insurance arrangements with each other, thus creating risk-sharing networks. Whereas in developed economies we observe the opposite situation. People rely more on formal insurance to cover their risks and less on informal links. A very recent empirical literature suggests that the introduction of formal insurance products affects informal risk-sharing among individuals. Either it strengthens the solidarity or it reduces it. This work-in-progress is the first to tackle this issue from a theoretical viewpoint. To do so, we use a network-based approach. We introduce formal insurance into the model of formation of risk-sharing networks by Bramoullé and Kranton (2007). To the benchmark where individuals commit to sharing monetary holdings equally with a linked partner, we add the possibility for each agent to take out formal insurance. Our model preliminary results establish a relation between the structure of the risk-sharing networks that emerged and the situation on the insurance market. 

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