Kohmei Makihara*, Valentin Tissot**
Lucie Giorgi: lucie.giorgi[at]univ-amu.fr
Ricardo Guzman: ricardo.guzman[at]univ-amu.fr
Natalia Labrador: natalia.labrador-bernate[at]univ-amu.fr
Nathan Vieira: nathan.vieira[at]univ-amu.fr
*This paper analyzes the design of a mechanism for the planner to allocate a good with externalities to agents having different type. The objective of the planner is to maximize the utilitarian welfare, which amounts to allocate the entire good to the highest type. I consider the setting in which each agent knows the type of their neighbors into the network, so that the planner can use the information that each agent has about his neighbors. The paper proposes a 2-stage mechanism which divides the players into self-reporting players (i.e. reporting that himself is the highest type in the neighborhood) and non self-reporting players, and identify the highest type by using the reports of non self-reporting players. The paper shows that the unique equilibrium allocation of this mechanism is to allocate whole good to the highest type, if all pairs of players have a common neighbor.
**Using value-added models, this paper investigates the role of high school in students' orientation choices. I use French administrative data providing information on all high school students who applied to higher education and estimate high school value-added in France between 2014 and 2017 for more than one million students. I then study the impact of high school value-added on orientation choices using applications made by 12th grade students for the first year of higher education. I find that attending a high school with one standard deviation higher value-added causes an increase in the probability of applying to selective programs by 3.7 percentage points. I also find weaker effects for low-SES and female students.