A key for development and female empowerment in developing countries goes through encouraging female entrepreneurship. But recent evidence shows that female entrepreneurs tend to invest in their husband’s firm instead of their own when facing a choice of investment. It is then crucial for female entrepreneurship to understand how this decision is made within the household. Within the framework of a classical collective model of the household, we theoretically analyze spouses’ investment decisions. We find that this choice is not only determined by differences of returns of projects, but also by bargaining powers of spouses. There are areas of conflict, where investment preferences of each spouse are not aligned. We analyze how in those cases, women can be kept from investing with the threat of domestic violence, or how they can choose to make a transfer to their husband to make him want her to invest. We ultimately provide a preliminary outline of an identification strategy to test our predictions. Using Indian DHS data, we want to look if the end of the MultiFibre Agreement and the rise of microcredit in India increased domestic violence in couples.