Feriel Kandil

Faculty ,  Aix-Marseille Université , Faculté d'économie et de gestion (FEG)

Public economics
Status
Assistant professor
Research domain(s)
Economic philosophy, Social choice
Thesis
2001, University of Paris-Nanterre
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Contact
feriel.kandil[at]univ-amu.fr
+33(0)4 13 55 25 55
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AMU - AMSE
5-9 Boulevard Maurice Bourdet, CS 50498
​13205 Marseille Cedex 1

Abstract The article explores Ricœur’s critical interpretation of Rawls’ theory of social justice. While Ricœur has a dialectical conception of justice (where the “good” encompasses the “just”), contrasting with Rawls’ procedural approach (where the just is defined independently of the good), Ricœur shows a strong interest in Rawls’ ideas. He situates Rawls’ project within one of the moments of the dialectic of the just: the moral moment. This dialectic arises from the aporetic nature of the just and manifests in ethical life as three paradoxes: political, legal, and socio-economic. While Rawls’ approach struggles with these paradoxes, they are the driving force of Ricœur’s approach to justice, highlighting its strength.
Keywords Rawls, Social justice, Ethics and morality, Dialectic, Fairness, Practical wisdom, Moral sense, Injustice, Injustice, Sens moral, Sagesse pratique, Équité, Dialectique, Éthique et morale, Rawls, Justice sociale
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Abstract La logique voudrait que Ricoeur se livre à une critique acerbe tant la conception dialectique de la justice qu'il défend, et conformément à laquelle le bon englobe le juste, s'oppose à la conception purement procédurale de Rawls. Pourtant, Ricoeur insiste sur l'extrême intérêt qu'il porte à « l'ouvrage immense de Rawls ». Ricoeur situe le projet rawlsien dans la dialectique de la justice, et le rapporte à l'un des moments de cette dialectique, à savoir le moment moral. Mais, l'enjeu majeur du commentaire de Ricoeur est plus large : il consiste à mettre l'accent sur le contenu aporétique du juste, lequel est pris « entre le légal et le bon ». L'aporie prend la forme, dans l'approche ricoeurienne de la justice sociale, de trois paradoxes : le paradoxe de la justice politique, le paradoxe de la justice juridique et le paradoxe de la justice socio-économique. Face à ces paradoxes, le projet rawlsien développé́ dans Théorie de la justice révèle à la fois ses forces et ses limites.
Keywords Justice sociale, Équité, Universalité, Ricoeur, Rawls
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Abstract Dans son dernier ouvrage intitulé Measuring Social Welfare, Matthew Adler propose un vaste panorama portant sur les méthodes d’évaluation du bien-être social et sur les débats auxquels le développement de ces méthodes a donné lieu en choix social. L’enjeu de l’ouvrage est double. Il est d’une part de fournir à la communauté des étudiant(e)s et des chercheur(e)s en sciences économiques et sociales mais aussi en sciences politiques un manuel en choix social à la fois abordable techniquement tout en étant exigeant et rigoureux. Il est d’autre part, de montrer la pertinence à la fois sur le plan théorique et sur le plan pratique du programme de recherche développé en choix social autour des fonctions de bien-être social. Par là-même, ainsi que l’avance Matthew Adler, l’ouvrage contribue de fait à combler un vide dans la littérature sur les fonctions de bien-être social développées depuis cinquante ans. Cette littérature étant particulièrement mathématisée, elle s’adresse, le plus souvent, à un public d’initiés. L’apport premier de l’ouvrage est de décloisonner le savoir issu de la théorie du choix social, le rendant accessible à un public d’étudiant(e)s et de chercheur(e)s s’interrogeant sur l’évaluation sociale. Pour ce faire, l’ouvrage est rédigé de sorte à permettre différents niveaux de lecture : en particulier, les développements portant sur les aspects les plus formels de l’analyse mathématique sont placés en annexe et, outre la bibliographie très complète placée en fin d’ouvrage, chaque chapitre comporte une bibliographie restreinte accessible au plus grand nombre…
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Abstract As Ricoeur acknowledges, the publication of Rawls’s book, A Theory of Justice(TJ), in 1971 was a major event in the area of contemporary political philoso-phy. Ricoeur offers important comments on Rawls’s approach to justice. These commentaries are mainly based on a close reading of this book. This article focuses on such commentaries. They are at the same time glowing and critical. Ricoeur expresses his support to Rawls for his illuminating study of justice, seen as a virtue of institutions. ...
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Abstract As Ricoeur acknowledges, the publication of Rawls' book, A Theory of Justice (TJ), in 1971 was a major event in the area of contemporary political philosophy. Ricoeur offers important comments on Rawls' approach to justice. These commentaries are mainly based on a close reading of this book. This article focuses on such commentaries. They are at the same time glowing and critical. Ricoeur expresses his support to Rawls for his illuminating study of justice, seen as a virtue of institutions. Indeed, in TJ, Rawls focuses on the two following questions. First, how can we identify the most basic universal standards and requirements concerning justice? Second, what formal expression can we find for such requirements? The fundamental issue at stake is the identification of the principles of just institutions: such principles are at the basis of the rule of law. 1 Ricoeur agrees with Rawls that addressing such issues demand reference to both the deontological perspective on morals and the political tradition of the social contract. At the same time, Ricoeur is uncomfortable with the pure and procedural approach of justice that Rawls supports. According to this approach, the characterisation of the just is meant to be independent from the definition of the good. Ricoeur disagrees with this claim. He insists on the fact that justice does not refer primarily to the virtue of the institutions; rather, it refers first to an ethical desire. As Ricoeur notes, this desire, which is commonly called "a sense of justice", expresses itself mostly negatively by means of a cry of indignation: "it's unfair!" 1 The first question leads Rawls to his theory of fairness. The second one leads him to the characterisation of the two Rawlsian principles of justice.
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Abstract The paper shows that, when dealing with social justice, it is necessary but not sufficient to consider the social evaluator as placed behind a veil of ignorance. Then, her judgements are conform to the moral principle of universalisation and thus are impartial. But the way such judgements should be modelled depends on the interpretation, whether utilitarian or Kantian, given to the universalisation principle. The article compares the utilitarian model of the impartial observer from Harsanyi with the Kantian model of the ignorant observer from Gajdos and Kandil. It defends the latter, which shows that, differently to what Rawls claimed, the maximin is not the unique rule of decision under ignorance. Classification JEL : B41, D60, D63
Keywords Economie quantitative
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Abstract Theories of Action and Normativity. Harsanyi's account of the rational ethical behaviour refers explicitly to A. Smith's mecanism of the impartial spectator. A comparison between the two authors shows important differences concerning the impartial spectator's moral judgement. In Harsanyi's case, it is a determinant judgement that calculates the consequences of actions according to moral preferences. For Smith, the impartial spectator operates in an analogical manner to evaluate the actor's motives in specific situations.lt is a reflective judgement, in Kant's sens. The article delves into the different conceptions of actions and relations between morals and economics that lie between these two kinds of judgement.
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Abstract The article conducts a comparative study between Ricœur’s and Rawls’ thought on justice. Whereas Ricoeur focuses on the dialectic between the just and the good, Rawls is concerned with the ideal conditions under which a universal consensus on the principles of justice may be reached. Ricœur gives much importance to reading Rawls. He offers many commentaries, especially on Rawls’s major contribution, A Theory of Justice. This chapter focuses on such comments and on the relating paradoxical interpretation of Rawls’s approach to justice Ricœur provides. First, this chapter suggests that, with his interpretation of Rawls’s major contribution, Ricœur contributes to put the light on the conflicts between the just and the good. These conflicts are the key elements of what may be referred to as the aporia of the just, which consists in the contradictory requirements coming from the just considered as a virtue of either institutions or individuals. Second, this chapter shows that whereas the aporia is a major problem in Rawls’ approach to justice, it is at the core of the dialectic dynamic Ricœur sees within moral life. In his work, the aporia leads to what we call the three paradoxes of justice, which are the paradoxes with legal, distributive and political justice. Considering such paradoxes, Ricœur takes the ethics of practical wisdom as a necessary recourse. The latter provides fair decision makers with the resources needed for the aporia to be, if not resolved, at least eased.
Keywords Distributive justice, Legal justice, Political justice, The just, The good, Principles of justice, Kant, Aristotle, Ricœur, Rawls, Political paradox, Sense of justice, Social justice
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