Teschl

Publications

Pareto rationalizability by two single-peaked preferencesJournal articleRicardo Arlegi and Miriam Teschl, Mathematical Social Sciences, Volume 118, pp. 1-11, 2022

We study, in a finite setting, the problem of Pareto rationalizability of choice functions by means of a preference profile that is single-peaked with respect to an exogenously given linear order over the alternatives. This problem requires a new condition to be added to those that characterize Pareto rationalizability in the general domain of orders (Moulin (1985)). This new condition appeals to the existence of a central range of options such that the choice function excludes alternatives which are distant from that range.

Tracking the dynamics and allocating tests for COVID-19 in real-time: An acceleration index with an application to French age groups and départementsJournal articleChristelle Baunez, Mickael Degoulet, Stéphane Luchini, Patrick A. Pintus and Miriam Teschl, PLoS ONE, Volume 16, Issue 6, pp. e0252443, 2021

An acceleration index is proposed as a novel indicator to track the dynamics of COVID-19 in real-time. Using data on cases and tests in France for the period between the first and second lock-downs—May 13 to October 25, 2020—our acceleration index shows that the pandemic resurgence can be dated to begin around July 7. It uncovers that the pandemic acceleration was stronger than national average for the [59–68] and especially the 69 and older age groups since early September, the latter being associated with the strongest acceleration index, as of October 25. In contrast, acceleration among the [19–28] age group was the lowest and is about half that of the [69–78]. In addition, we propose an algorithm to allocate tests among French “départements” (roughly counties), based on both the acceleration index and the feedback effect of testing. Our acceleration-based allocation differs from the actual distribution over French territories, which is population-based. We argue that both our acceleration index and our allocation algorithm are useful tools to guide public health policies as France might possibly enter a third lock-down period with indeterminate duration.

Ce que nous voulons et pouvons savoir lors d’une pandémieBook chapterStéphane Luchini, Patrick Pintus and Miriam Teschl, In: Carnet de l'EHESS : Perspectives sur le Coronavirus, 2021-09, pp. 87-91, EHESS, 2021

Comment mesurer le plus finement possible l'accélération ou la décélération d'une épidémie ?

Sub-national allocation of COVID-19 tests: An efficiency criterion with an application to Italian regionsJournal articleChristelle Baunez, Mickael Degoulet, Stéphane Luchini, Patrick A. Pintus and Miriam Teschl, Covid Economics, Volume 12, pp. 192-209, 2020

Tests are crucial to know about the number of people who have fallen ill with COVID-19 and to understand in real-time whether the dynamics of the pandemic is accelerating or decelerating. But tests are a scarce resource in many countries. The key but still open question is thus how to allocate tests across sub-national levels. We provide a data-driven and operational criterion to allocate tests efficiently across regions or provinces, with the view to maximize detection of people who have been infected. We apply our criterion to Italian regions and compute the shares of tests that should go to each region, which are shown to differ significantly from the actual distribution.Mickael Degoule

Evolutionary behavioral economicsBook chapterTerence C. Burnham, Stephen E. G. Lea, Adrian V. Bell, Herbert Gintis, Paul W. Glimcher, Robert Kurzban, Leonhard Lades, Kevin McCabe, Karthik Panchanathan, Miriam Teschl, et al., In: Complexity and Evolution Toward a New Synthesis for Economics, David S. Wilson and Alan Kirman (Eds.), 2016-08, pp. 113-144, MIT Press, 2016

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Conflict, Commitment and Well-BeingBook chapterRitxar Arlegi and Miriam Teschl, In: Well-Being in Contemporary Society, Johnny H. Søraker, Jan-Willem Van der Rijt, Jelle de Boer, Pak-Hang Wong and Philip Brey (Eds.), 2015, pp. 73-92, Springer International Publishing, 2015

There are two important discussions of commitment in economic literature: one is commitment à la Elster and Schelling, which is related to self-binding choices and means that the person has the desire to restrict the future set of options. The other is commitment à la Sen, which implies a different rationality from the standard maximization rationality and means that the person can choose an option which is not necessarily best for her. In this paper, we set out to show that these two discussions of commitment are related. We do so by presenting a theory of choice under motivation conflict , followed by a discussion of the consequences that the reading of commitment through motivation conflict has on well-being.

Effort and Redistribution: Is More than Value Judgement Involved?Book chapterStéphane Luchini and Miriam Teschl, In: Jahrbuch Normative und institutionelle Grundfragen der Ökonomik, Band 14: Reformen und ihre politisch-ökonomischen Fallstricke, Martin Held, G. Kubon-Gilke and Richard Sturn (Eds.), 2015-01, pp. 165-184, Metropolis Verlag, 2015

The log-normal distribution is convenient for modelling the income distribution, and it offers an analytical expression for most inequality indices that depends only on the shape parameter of the associated Lorenz curve. A decomposable inequality index can be implemented in the framework of a finite mixture of log-normal distributions so that overall inequality can be composed into within-subgroup components. Using a Bayesian approach and a Gibbs sampler, a Rao-Blackwellization can improve inference results on decomposable income inequality indices. The very nature of the economic question can provide prior information so as to distinguish between the income groups and construct an asymmetric prior density which can reduce label switching. Data from the UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES) (1979 to 1996) are used in an extended empirical application.

Individual and Collective Choice and Social WelfareBookStudies in Choice and Welfare, Constanze Binder, Giulio Codognato, Miriam Teschl and Yongsheng Xu (Eds.), 2015-05, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015

The papers in this volume explore various issues relating to theories of individual and collective choice, and theories of social welfare. The topics include individual and collective rationality, motivation and intention in economics, coercion, public goods, climate change, and voting theory. The book offers an excellent overview over latest research in these fields.

Conflicts in Decision MakingBook chapterRitxar Arlegi and Miriam Teschl, In: Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Constanze Binder, Giulio Codognato, Miriam Teschl and Yongsheng Xu (Eds.), 2015-05, pp. 11-29, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015

Following Nick Baigent’s argument that one must go “behind the veil of preference” (Baigent, Jpn Econ Rev 46(1):88–101, 1995) to be able to develop a satisfactory theory of rational behaviour, we propose to analyse potential intrapersonal conflicts caused by different reasons, goals or motivations to choose one option over another, which may make the development of a coherent preference impossible. We do this by presenting an extensive, but certainly not exhaustive overview of psychological research on intrapersonal conflict, its influence on preference reversal (and hence on incoherent behaviour), on psychological well-being and on motivational and behavioural changes over time. We then briefly describe our own theory of choice under conflicting motivations (Arlegi and Teschl, Working Papers of the Department of Economics DT 1208, Public University of Navarre, 2012), which is a first attempt at putting psychological insights into intrapersonal conflict into an axiomatic economic context.

Conflicts in Decision MakingBook chapterRitxar Arlegi and Miriam Teschl, In: Individual and Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Constanze Binder, Giulio Codognato, Miriam Teschl and Yongsheng Xu (Eds.), 2015-05, pp. 11-29, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2015

Following Nick Baigent’s argument that one must go “behind the veil of preference” (Baigent, Jpn Econ Rev 46(1):88–101, 1995) to be able to develop a satisfactory theory of rational behaviour, we propose to analyse potential intrapersonal conflicts caused by different reasons, goals or motivations to choose one option over another, which may make the development of a coherent preference impossible. We do this by presenting an extensive, but certainly not exhaustive overview of psychological research on intrapersonal conflict, its influence on preference reversal (and hence on incoherent behaviour), on psychological well-being and on motivational and behavioural changes over time. We then briefly describe our own theory of choice under conflicting motivations (Arlegi and Teschl, Working Papers of the Department of Economics DT 1208, Public University of Navarre, 2012), which is a first attempt at putting psychological insights into intrapersonal conflict into an axiomatic economic context.