AMU - AMSE
5-9 Boulevard Maurice Bourdet, CS 50498
13205 Marseille Cedex 1
Ventelou
Publications
Background:
From November 2014 to November 2015, an experiment in French community pharmacies replaced traditional pre-packed boxes by per-unit dispensing of pills in the exact numbers prescribed, for 14 antibiotics.
Methods:
A cluster randomised control trial was carried out in 100 pharmacies. 75 pharmacies counted out the medication by units (experimental group), the other 25 providing the treatment in the existing pharmaceutical company boxes (control group). Data on patients under the two arms were compared to assess the environmental, economic and health effects of this change in drug dispensing. In particular, adherence was measured indirectly by comparing the number of pills left at the end of the prescribed treatment.
Results:
Out of the 1185 patients included during 3 sessions of 4 consecutive weeks each, 907 patients experimented the personalized delivery and 278 were assigned to the control group, consistent with a 1/3 randomization-rate at the pharmacy level. 80% of eligible patients approved of the per-unit dispensing of their treatment. The initial packaging of the drugs did not match with the prescription in 60% of cases and per-unit dispensing reduced by 10% the number of pills supplied. 13.1% of patients declared that they threw away pills residuals instead of recycling—no differences between groups. Finally, per-unit dispensing appeared to improve adherence to antibiotic treatment (marginal effect 0.21, IC 95, 0.14–0.28).
Conclusions:
Supplying antibiotics per unit is not only beneficial in terms of a reduced number of pills to reimburse or for the environment (less pills wasted and non-recycled), but also has a positive and unexpected impact on adherence to treatment, and thus on both individual and public health.
This paper analyses how French general practitioners? (GPs) labour supply would respond to changes in their fee per consultation, seeking to determine whether there is a backward-bending curve.?Because French GPs? fees only evolve very slowly and are generally fixed by the National Health Insurance Fund, fee variability is not sufficient to observe changes in labour supply.?Therefore, we designed a contingent valuation survey randomly presenting GPs with three hypothetical fee increases.?Empirical evidence from 1,400 GPs supports the hypothesis of a negative slope in their labour supply curve.?This suggests that increasing fees is not an effective policy to increase the supply of medical services. JEL Codes: C21, I12, J22, J4.
This study evaluated the impact of infectious disease (ID) specialist referrals on outcomes in a tertiary hospital in France. This study tackled methodological constraints (selection bias, endogeneity) using instrumental variables (IV) methods in order to obtain a quasi-experimental design. In addition, we investigated whether certain characteristics of patients have a bearing on the impact of the intervention. We used the payments database and ID department files to obtain data for adults admitted with an ID diagnosis in the North Hospital, Marseille from 2012 to 2014. Comparable cohorts were obtained using coarsened exact matching and analysed using IV models. Mortality, readmissions, cost (payer perspective) and length of stay (LoS) were analysed. We recorded 15,393 (85.97%) stays, of which 2,159 (14.03%) benefited from IDP consultations. The intervention was seen to significantly lower the risk of inpatient mortality (marginal effect (M.E) = –19.06%) and cost of stay (average treatment effect (ATE) = – €5,573.39). The intervention group was seen to have a longer LoS (ATE = +4.95 days). The intervention conferred a higher reduction in mortality and cost for stays that experienced ICU care (mortality: odds ratio (OR) =0.09, M.E cost = –8,328.84 €) or had a higher severity of illness (mortality: OR=0.35, M.E cost = –1,331.92 €) and for patients aged between 50 and 65 years (mortality: OR=0.28, M.E cost = -874.78 €). This study shows that ID referrals are associated with lower risk of inpatient mortality and cost of stay, especially when targeted to certain subgroups.
Dans plusieurs pays en développement et en particulier au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord, l’informalité est regardée comme une fatalité et laisse une proportion importante de la population non couverte par le système de sécurité sociale. Une enquête d’évaluation contingente a été menée en Tunisie en 2013, se proposant d’estimer les consentements à payer (CAP) pour deux régimes hypothétiques d’assurance volontaire : un régime d’assurance maladie géré par la ‘Caisse Nationale d’Assurance Maladie’ et un régime vieillesse géré par la ‘Caisse Nationale de Sécurité Sociale’.
L’échantillon se compose de 456 individus non couverts par un régime de sécurité sociale (maladie ou vieillesse), interrogés dans les régions Nord, Centre et Sud du pays. Les personnes interrogées ont été recrutées sur les marchés (souks) – caractérisés par la forte présence d’acteurs du secteur informel – et les places publiques (Al-mydan) – où s’organisaient régulièrement des rassemblements pacifiques de chômeurs pour revendiquer des droits sociaux peu après ce qui a été appelé ‘le printemps Arabe’ qui a débuté en Tunisie fin 2010.
L’intention d’adhésion déclarée par les travailleurs informels et les sans-emploi varie selon le type de filière de soins proposée et selon les risques couverts (avec ou sans assurance-vieillesse). Les résultats confirment les hypothèses selon lesquelles une affiliation volontaire à deux régimes d’assurance serait majoritairement acceptée par les non couverts et les CAPs déclarés pour cette affiliation seraient substantiels. Ils apportent donc des éléments de discussion en termes de politiques tunisiennes de santé (objectif de couverture santé universelle) et d’assurance-vieillesse.
Finalement, nos résultats montrent d’une part que l’informalité n’est pas un choix des individus et que le contrôle de l’évasion sociale en Tunisie est possible. D’autre part, la comparaison manifestants/non manifestants montre qu’il est possible de généraliser une offre d’assurance sociale au-delà du cercle restreint des « activistes ».
-
-
Background:
Recently, French policymakers have tried to improve care at the end-of-life, by improving access to community-based palliative care, particularly for patients with cancer and neurological diseases. If effective, these efforts should reduce the proportion of such patients who die in the hospital. In light of these policies, we sought to determine the effectiveness of these efforts on reducing inpatient deaths by conducting a retrospective, observational analysis of patients aged 65 and older who were admitted to hospitals in France between 2010 and 2013 for 1 of 3 non-surgical conditions.
Methods:
We calculated department-specific age- and sex-adjusted inpatient death rates for 3 types of non-surgical admissions and modeled expected number of inpatient deaths had their rates for patients with cancer or neurological disease tracked those of patients with non-cancer non-neurological diseases.
Results:
We found that patients admitted with a cancer diagnosis experienced 20,394 (13.0%) fewer inpatient deaths that expected had non-surgical cancer diagnosis admission rates tracked those of non-surgical non-cancer and non-neurological admission rates; patients admitted with a primary neurological disease diagnosis experienced 513 (4.5%) fewer inpatient deaths than expected. During the study period, observed-to-expected inpatient deaths fell more dramatically and consistently for patients admitted with cancer diagnoses than for those admitted with neurological diseases. Observed-to-expected ratios fell least in departments that were on the periphery of the French mainland.
Conclusions:
Our findings suggest that, in France, efforts to reduce inpatient death rates among patients with cancer or neurological disease diagnoses appear to be effective. However, their effectiveness varies geographically, suggesting that targeted efforts to improve lower performing departments may generate substantial performance improvements.
Evidence suggests that the effect of health expenditure on health outcomes is highly context-specific and may be driven by other factors. We construct a panel dataset of 18 countries from the Middle East and North Africa region for the period 1995–2012. Panel data models are used to estimate the macro-level determinants of health outcomes. The core finding of the paper is that increasing health expenditure leads to health outcomes improvements only to the extent that the quality of institutions within a country is sufficiently high. The sensitivity of the results is assessed using various measures of health outcomes as well as institutional variables. Overall, it appears that increasing health care expenditure in the MENA region is a necessary but not sufficient condition for health outcomes improvements.
Abstract Objectives The French pay-for-performance (P4P) contract CAPI implemented by the national health insurance included a target-goal which aims at reducing benzodiazepines prescriptions. In this investigation, we would like to assess whether: (1) the general practitioners (GPs) having signed P4P contract obtain better results regarding the target-goal than non-signatories; (2) (part of) this progression is due to the CAPI contract itself (tentative measurement of a “causal effect”); (3) (part of) the money spent on this P4P incentive can be self-financed with the amount of pharmaceuticals saved. Methods We matched cross-sectional and longitudinal data including 4622 French GPs from June 2011 to December 2012. A treatment effect model using instrumental variables was performed to take into account potential self-selection issue in signing. After having identified the NET impact of the P4P, we calculate the cost of an avoided benzodiazepines treatment. Results In our study, GPs who have signed the CAPI contract (36 % of the sample) are more numerous in achieving benzodiazepines target goal than non-signatories: 90.7 vs. 85.5 %. After controlling for the self-selection bias, the propensity of GPs to achieve the benzodiazepines target is only 0.31 % higher for signatories than for their non-signing counterparts—estimate for June 2012, which yields a statistically significant gap. Our economic analysis demonstrates that the CAPI contract does not allow savings, but presents in 2012 a NET cost of 93.6€ per avoided benzodiazepines treatment (291€ in 2011). Conclusions The P4P contract has a positive but modest impact on the achievement of GPs regarding benzodiazepines indicator.