Ali Adeli*, Mathis Preti**

Internal seminars
phd seminar

Ali Adeli*, Mathis Preti**

AMU*, AMSE**
Exploring Effort in Neuroeconomics: A Review and Quantitative Examination*
Diversion Research**
Joint with
Anne-Sophie Dubarry, Marie-Helene Grosbras, Stéphane Luchini, Miriam Teschl*
Yann Bramoullé, Charles Figuières**
Venue

IBD Amphi

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Tuesday, March 12 2024| 11:00am to 12:30pm
Contact(s)

Lucie Giorgi: lucie.giorgi[at]univ-amu.fr
Ricardo Guzman: ricardo.guzman[at]univ-amu.fr
Natalia Labrador: natalia.labrador-bernate[at]univ-amu.fr
Nathan Vieira: nathan.vieira[at]univ-amu.fr

Abstract

*This paper provides an overview of the concept of effort within the realm of neuroeconomics and discusses methods for its quantification. It surveys existing literature on effort and cognitive effort, delineating two predominant perspectives: active arousal and negative valence. These perspectives offer distinct predictions and suggest varied approaches to measuring effort and its relationship with performance. To adjudicate between these perspectives, we present a novel experimental design incorporating pupillometry and electroencephalography (EEG) data acquisition. Preliminary findings from the experiment lend support to the arousal perspective of cognitive effort.

**Industrial lobbies often fund scientific studies strategically aimed at diverting public attention from their culpability in health or environmental issues, perpetuating doubt, and delaying regulatory measures. We call this strategy “diversion research”. To understand what determines its use, we propose a new model to study firms’ special interests in funding academic research. The harmfulness of industrial activity is uncertain, but the government can regulate it to maximize the expected social welfare perceived by scientists. Firms, coordinating as a lobby, offer money to influence what scientists study. We find that this lobby is interested in funding diversion research when the current science does not indicate a need for regulation. Surprisingly, when the science indicates that regulation is required, firms might even fund research on their own harmfulness. This article highlights the importance of preserving academic freedom to prevent first-order welfare losses due to the use of diversion research. One possibility is to allow private funding, with allocation overseen by an independent committee.