Luciana Fiorini

ecolunch

Luciana Fiorini

University of Western Australia
Expectational stability in aggregative games
Joint with
Wilfredo Maldonado, Richard Cornes (deceased)
Venue

IBD Amphi

Îlot Bernard du Bois - Amphithéâtre

AMU - AMSE
5-9 boulevard Maurice Bourdet
13001 Marseille

Date(s)
Thursday, June 15 2017| 12:30pm to 1:45pm
Contact(s)

Ugo Bolletta: ugo.bolletta2[at]unibo.it
Mathieu Faure: mathieu.faure[at]univ-amu.fr

Abstract

Using the replacement function associated with aggregative games, we analyze the expectational dynamics of the aggregate strategy of the game. We can interpret the Nash equilibrium of the game as the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) of the system, and we examine the expectational stability of the REE. We characterize local stability in terms of fundamentals and the REE itself. We illustrate the results through well-known aggregative games (Cournot games, Bertrand competition with differentiated goods, rent seeking games, and the public goods provision game) and analyze their global expectational dynamics.