We present a model where labor supply decisions are made jointly by imperfectly assortatively matched couples and firms, which respond to the joint nature of these decisions. Parenthood requires one of the parents to take time out of the labor force, but a contracting friction imposes a cost on firms when this occurs. Assortative mating rules out that identical productivity types of both genders are being paid a unique wage without discrimination. Gender-discriminatory equilibria exist in which firms condition wages on gender and productivity type. However, there also exist 'wage dispersion'-equilibria, in which women and men face identical wage distributions given productivity. Wage dispersion originates in the direct competition between the firm employing the man and the different firm employing the woman in a couple. Across equilibria, there always is wage inequality conditional on productivity, but it expresses itself along different dimensions, as gender discrimination or wage dispersion within both genders. The efficiency comparison across equilibria is nontrivial, with a trade-off between ex-ante coordination across firms hiring the different genders vs within-household misallocation (e.g. a less productive husband remaining in the market while a productive wife drops out).